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INTRODUCTION
In this Essay, I develop an alternative to the two main views of law that
have dominated legal thought. My view offers a novel account of how the
actions of legal institutions make the law what it is, and a correspondingly
novel account of how to interpret legal texts. According to my view, legal
obligations are a certain subset of moral obligations.' Legal institutions -
legislatures, courts, administrative agencies-take actions that change our
moral obligations. They do so by changing the morally relevant facts and
circumstances, for example by changing people's expectations, providing new
options, or bestowing the blessing of the people's representatives on particular
schemes. My theory holds, very roughly, that the resulting moral obligations
are legal obligations. I call this view the Moral Impact Theory because it holds
that the law is the moral impact of the relevant actions of legal institutions.2
1. I clarify what I mean by moral obligations infra Subsection II.A.i.
2. In earlier work on the nature of law, I develop a variety of arguments that support a type of
position along the lines of the Moral Impact Theory. This note provides references to that
work for interested readers. The earlier work falls into three strands. The most important
articles in the first strand are Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, lo LEGAL THEORY 157
(2004), corrected version reprinted in EXPLORING LAW'S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
RONALD DWORKIN 225 (Scott Hershovitz ed., 20o6) [hereinafter Greenberg, How Facts Make
Law]; Mark Greenberg, On Practices and the Law, 12 LEGAL THEORY 113 (20o6); and Mark
Greenberg, Hartian Positivism and Normative Facts: How Facts Make Law II, in EXPLORING
LAw's EMPIRE, supra [hereinafter Greenberg, How Facts Make Law II]. For additional work
in this vein, see Mark Greenberg, How Facts Make Law and the Nature of Moral Facts, 40
DIREITO, ESTADO E SOCIEDADE 165 (2012); Mark Greenberg, Reasons Without Values?, in 2
SOCIAL, POLITICAL, & LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 133 (Enrique Villanueva ed., 2007); and Mark
Greenberg, Explaining Legal Facts (UCLA Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 08-19, 2007),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1139135. These articles focus on the relation between the
determinants of law and the content of the law. As they explain, it is fundamental to our
ordinary understanding of the law that the determinants must provide reasons for the
obtaining of the legal facts (in a sense of "reason" that I explicate). I argue that non-
normative facts cannot by themselves determine the content of the law because they cannot
explain their own relevance to the content of the law. Normative facts are the best
candidates for what can provide the necessary reasons.
The second strand comprises Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its Discontents,
in I OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011)
[hereinafter Greenberg, The Standard Picture], and a work-in-progress, Mark Greenberg,
Beyond the Standard Picture (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). A central idea
here, very roughly, is that a legal system is defective to the extent that it produces legal
obligations that are not all-things-considered binding. As I argue, this idea points in the
direction of a view on which legal obligations are a subset of moral obligations, and legal
institutions create and modify legal obligations by modifying the morally relevant facts.
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In order to provide an informal introduction to the theory, I begin by
illustrating the theory's account of statutory interpretation and contrasting that
account with two more familiar accounts of statutory interpretation (those
offered by the two main opposing views of law). I use an example drawn from
the well-known case of Smith v. United States.3 Smith had offered to trade a gun
for cocaine. The Supreme Court divided over the question whether he was
properly sentenced under a statute that provides for increased penalties if the
defendant "uses .. . a firearm" in a drug-trafficking or violent crime.
According to a standard account of what statutory interpretation involves,
in interpreting a statute, we seek the meaning or, better, the linguistic content
of the statutory text.4 This account is assumed without argument by both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Smith.5 Smith highlights a serious problem
for this account, however. As the contemporary study of language and
communication has made clear, there are multiple components and types of
In The Standard Picture and Its Discontents, I sketched the outlines of such a position in
general terms. Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra, at 57-60, 96-102. The version
sketched there, which I called the Dependence View, was incomplete because, among other
things, it took a position only on what constitutes the content of the law when the legal
system operates as it is supposed to. The Moral Impact Theory is a way of developing the
Dependence View according to which the content of the law is constituted in the same way
when the legal system operates as it is supposed to and when it does not. See id. at 57-58.
(There are a variety of other ways of developing the Dependence View; one possibility, for
example, is to hold that when the legal system does not operate as it is supposed to, the legal
obligations have the content of the moral obligations that would have been created had the
legal system operated as it is supposed to.)
The third strand comprises Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? Legal
Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) [hereinafter
Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?]. In this article, I argue that considerations from
the study of language and communication are inadequate to explain the relevance of, and to
adjudicate between, different candidates for a statute's contribution to the content of the
law. Moral considerations are a promising candidate to provide what is missing.
3. 508 U.S. 223 (1993). In Section III.A, I use this example to explicate my theory's account of
statutory interpretation in greater detail.
4. I do not mean to suggest that the account is standardly followed in practice. In fact, I think
that the account does not well describe much of the actual practice of statutory
interpretation. See Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 72-81. Rather, I mean
that the account is a standard way of describing the practice. On the term linguistic content,
see infra notes 18-19 and accompanying text. We will see that some linguistic contents are
constituted by the contents of mental states, for example the contents of speakers'
intentions.
5. For discussion of the opinions in Smith, see infra Section III.A.
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linguistic content.6 In Smith, there are at least two types of linguistic content
plausibly associated with the statutory text that would yield opposite outcomes
in the case. First, there is the semantic content of the statutory text-roughly,
what is conventionally encoded in the words. Second, there is the
communicative content-roughly, what the legislature intended to communicate
(or meant) by enacting the relevant text.7
Trading a firearm is within the semantic content of the phrase "uses a
firearm," so the semantic content yields the result that Smith was properly
sentenced. Plausibly, however, Congress intended to communicate that using a
gun as a weapon was to receive an increased penalty.' For illustrative purposes,
I will assume that this was Congress's intention-what Congress meant. Thus,
the communicative content yields the result that Smith should not have been
sentenced to the increased penalty.
The familiar account according to which interpreting a statute is extracting
its linguistic content has no way of adjudicating between multiple linguistic
contents of the statutory text. The statutory text in Smith has both a semantic
content and a communicative content, and they point in opposite directions.
The account therefore offers no answer to the problem posed by Smith's
trading a gun for cocaine.
The opposing account of statutory interpretation associated with Ronald
Dworkin's influential theory of law instructs us to seek the principle that best
fits and justifies the statute.9 In Smith, we have two salient candidate
principles: that use of a gun for any purpose in connection with a violent or
drug crime warrants additional punishment; and that use of a gun as a weapon
in connection with a violent or drug crime warrants additional punishment.
Both principles fit about equally well-after all, the Supreme Court was
sharply divided over which of these two better captured the meaning of the
statutory text, and we have noted that both are plausibly linguistic contents of
the text. On Dworkin's account, the question then becomes which principle is
morally better-i.e., which principle would, ex ante, be a better one to have.o
6. See infra notes 38-39, 97-99 and accompanying text.
7. On this distinction, see infra note 97 and accompanying text.
8. As discussed below, Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion may have been groping for this idea,
though Scalia was not able to put it in these terms because he lacked the distinction between
semantic content and communicative content. See infra note 1o5 and accompanying text.
9. I have argued that fit and justification are best understood as two dimensions of
justification. See infra notes 29, 34 and accompanying text.
l0. See infra text following note 32; ifa note 34.
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Assuming that one principle is better than the other, Dworkin's account thus
does offer an answer to our problem. But the way in which it does so is
problematic. At least in general, a straightforward appeal to which
interpretation yields a morally better standard does not seem permissible in
legal interpretation.
On the account of statutory interpretation implied by my theory of law, we
interpret a statute by seeking to discover what impact the enactment of the
statute, along with relevant circumstances, had on our moral obligations. Thus,
we ask not which rule is morally better ex ante, but which moral obligations,
powers, and so on (if any) the legislature actually succeeded in bringing about.
What is the moral consequence of the fact that a majority of the members of
the legislature, with whatever intentions they had, voted for this text, with its
semantic content? Thus, for example, the semantic content and the
communicative content of the statutory text are relevant if, and to the extent
that, moral considerations, such as considerations of democracy and fairness,
make them relevant. It might be argued on democratic grounds, for example,
that the fact that popularly elected representatives intended to communicate a
particular decision provides a reason in favor of citizens' being bound by that
decision. But the upshot of democratic considerations is a complex matter. A
counterargument could be mounted that such a decision is binding on citizens
only to the extent that it is encoded in the meaning of the words that the
legislature used-mere intentions are not enough. Or it might be argued that,
in the actual circumstances of a particular enactment, for reasons of both
fairness and democracy, the public's understanding of a statute's effect matters
more than the legislature's actual intentions or the meaning of the words. To
the extent that moral considerations point in different directions, interpreting
the statute will require determining what the moral impact of the statute is,
after all of the relevant values have been given their due. And the answer to this
question may not correspond to any linguistic content of the statutory text.
It's worth noticing how natural this account of statutory interpretation is.
Return for a moment to the standard account, according to which statutory
interpretation seeks the linguistic content of the statutory text. When faced
with two or more linguistic contents that are competing candidates for a
statute's contribution to the law, it is very natural to appeal to considerations
such as democracy and fairness to try to adjudicate between them. For
example, one might try to argue that certain democratic considerations require
that the statute be interpreted in accordance with what the legislature intended
to communicate, rather than in accordance with the semantic content of the
text. Once we have gone this far, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that we
need to ask what the moral implications of the statute's enactment are on
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balance, that is, taking all of the relevant values into account, as opposed to
what certain aspects of democracy or fairness by themselves would support.
I have just sketched a way in which the Moral Impact Theory makes a
difference at a relatively practical level-with respect to our understanding of
statutory interpretation. Before concluding this Introduction, I would also like
to indicate how the theory relates to a larger understanding of law's nature
and, in particular, of what law, by its nature, is supposed to do or isfor." Often
our moral situation is worse than it could be in a particular way-namely, that
it would be better if our moral obligations (and powers, and so on) were
different from what they in fact are. For example, consider a situation in which
a community faces a problem, and there are many different ways to go about
solving the problem. For a variety of reasons-for instance, because one
person's efforts toward any given solution would not make a difference
without participation by many others-it is not the case that anyone has a
specific obligation to participate in a particular solution. But it would be better
if everyone did have such an obligation. The legal system can change the moral
situation for the better by changing the circumstances so that everyone does
have the obligation to participate in a particular solution. Although I will not
argue for it here, my view is that it is part of the nature of law that a legal
system is supposed to change our moral obligations in order to improve our
moral situation-not, of course, that legal systems always improve our moral
situation, but that they are defective as legal systems to the extent that they
do not.
The Moral Impact Theory fits smoothly into this background
understanding of law. Legal institutions take actions to change our moral
obligations by changing the relevant facts and circumstances. (In Section II.B.,
I explore a variety of ways in which they are able to do so.) With important
qualifications, the resulting moral obligations are legal obligations. If a legal
system is, by its nature, supposed to change moral obligations, it is not
surprising that the central feature of law - its content - is made up of the moral
obligations that the legal system brings about. Moreover, the view that a legal
system is supposed, not merely to change moral obligations, but to do so in a
way that improves the moral situation will, as we will see, play an important
role in determining which of the moral obligations that result from actions of
legal institutions are legal obligations.
n. For elaboration of the idea that it can be part of the nature of law that legal systems are
supposed to play a certain role, though actual legal systems often fail to do so, see
Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 86-89.
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Here is the plan for the rest of the Essay. In Part I, I situate the Moral
Impact Theory more fully by contrasting it with two dominant views of law. In
Part II, I develop the theory, beginning with a rough formulation and
gradually refining it. In Part III, I illustrate the theory's implications for legal
interpretation in greater detail than I did at the start. In Part IV, I address two
important objections to the theory.
I. SITUATING THE THEORY
The Moral Impact Theory stands in opposition to two dominant views of
law. In the Introduction, I sketched the difference between the Moral Impact
Theory's account of statutory interpretation and those of the dominant views.
In this Part, I introduce the two opposing views properly and explain briefly
how the Moral Impact Theory differs from them.
A few preliminaries. In a jurisdiction like that of the United States or
Massachusetts or France there are many legal obligations, powers, privileges,
and permissions. I will refer to all of the legal obligations, powers, and so on in
a given jurisdiction at a given time as the content of the law." (For brevity, when
context prevents confusion, I will sometimes simply use the law for the content
of the law.13) It is uncontroversial that at least many facts about the content of
the law in a given jurisdiction are not among the ultimate facts of the
universe.'4 Rather, we can explain why those facts obtain in terms of more
basic facts, including, of course, facts about what various legal institutions such
as legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts did and said and decided. I
will use the term determinants of legal content-or determinants, for short-for
the more basic facts that determine the content of the law.'5
A theory (or view) of law, in the sense in which I use the term, is a
constitutive explanation of the content of the law-i.e., an explanation of which
12. Strictly speaking, the content of the law is not, say, the obligation to take a particular action,
but that one is obligated to take the relevant action.
13. On different senses of the term law, see infra Subsection II.A.3.
14. I say "at least many," rather than "all," because some natural law theorists would maintain
that some legal norms are simply fundamental moral norms and that those moral norms are
among the ultimate facts of the universe. Thanks to Seana Shiffrin for pressing me to clarify
this point.
is. There is a technical issue regarding whether the determinants of legal content are facts,
events, states of affairs, etc. I will generally take them to be facts, but nothing in the
argument depends on this assumption.
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aspects of which more basic facts are the determinants of legal content, and of
how those determinants together make it the case that the various legal
obligations, powers, and so on are what they are.16 An example of the sort of
thesis that could be part of a theory of law is the thesis that the content of
constitutional law in the United States is constituted by the original public
meaning of the text of the U.S. Constitution.
The first of the two dominant views of law is the Standard Picture.
According to this vague picture-I hesitate to call it a theory-the content of
the law is primarily constituted by linguistic (or mental) contents associated
with the authoritative legal texts.'7 The Standard Picture is extremely widely
taken for granted, and assumed to be common ground (though it is rarely
explicitly espoused). In characterizing the Standard Picture, I use the phrase
"linguistic content" rather than "meaning" because the latter has multiple
senses, and I am trying to get at a particular one-what we might call meaning,
strictly speaking." Some linguistic contents are constituted by the contents of
16. On constitutive explanation, see Mark Greenberg, A New Map of Theories ofMental Content:
Constitutive Accounts and Normative Theories, 15 PHIL. ISSUES 299 (2005).
17. The point of the qualification "primarily" is that the Standard Picture allows that there may
be some divergence from its core model. There may be peripheral ways in which law can be
determined other than by the linguistic content of authoritative pronouncements, and the
Standard Picture also must supplement its core model with an account of how the content of
the law as a whole is derived from the individual legal norms that are constituted by
individual authoritative pronouncements. There needs to be, for example, a way of resolving
conflicts between such individual norms, and the Standard Picture may even allow some
more radical departures, such as filtering out or modifying absurd or immoral legal norms.
For elaboration and discussion of what this idea of primariness amounts to, see Greenberg,
The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 51-54. For a more nuanced account of the Standard
Picture generally, see id. at 40-55.
18. Language enables us reliably and systematically to convey information to others. The
information thus conveyed is linguistic content. There are a variety of aspects of linguistic
meaning, including semantic content and speaker's meaning. The important point for our
purposes is that linguistic contents can be systematically derived through reliable
mechanisms, mechanisms that are much studied in philosophy of language and linguistics.
Contrast meaning in this sense with a loose nonlinguistic sense of the word. In the latter
sense, meaning is roughly equivalent to significance, upshot, or consequence. For example,
one might ask the meaning of a recent political development or of an embarrassing
situation. Meaning in this sense is not a kind of linguistic content at all. See Greenberg, The
Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 47-48. Meaning in the sense of linguistic content also is to
be distinguished from legal meaning, where the legal meaning of, say, a statutory text is
simply its contribution to the content of the law. If we use meaning in the sense of legal
meaning, it is trivial to say that a statute's contribution to the law is its meaning. In these
terms, the Standard Picture holds, roughly, that an authoritative legal text's linguistic
content constitutes its legal meaning. For discussion of many types of linguistic and mental
1296
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mental states. For example, on a common view, the speaker's meaning of an
utterance is determined by the content of certain of his or her communicative
intentions. Moreover, the Standard Picture is often relaxed to include the
contents of other mental states associated with an authoritative text, such as
the content of a legislature's intention to achieve particular legal effects by
enacting a statute.
The Standard Picture has deep roots in ordinary thought about the law. A
simple version of this picture is encapsulated in the layperson's idea that the
law is what the code or law books say. And among legal philosophers, the
Standard Picture is widely taken for granted. 9 One reason is that it dovetails
with-and indeed fills a gap in-legal positivism, the most widely held position
in philosophy of law.2 o A central positivist thesis is that the content of the law
content and their relation to the content of the law, see Greenberg, Legislation as
Communication?, supra note 2.
ig. It is also plausible that many lawyers, judges, and law professors (other than legal
philosophers) take the Standard Picture for granted to the extent that they talk and think
about the theoretical issue of the relation between the determinants and the content of the
law. Certainly, practitioners and scholars often say that the goal of legal interpretation is to
ascertain the "meaning" of a legal text, such as a statute. (The majority and dissenting
opinions in Smith are an example.) It might be suggested, however, that such talk of the
"meaning" of a statute should be understood to refer to legal meaning-the statute's
contribution to the content of the law -not to its linguistic content. If "meaning" refers to
legal meaning, however, then it is vacuous to say that in working out a statute's contribution
to the law, we should seek the statute's meaning. More likely, many have not clearly
recognized the distinction between a statute's linguistic content and a statute's contribution
to the content of the law. And failing to make this distinction is, itself, a way of
presupposing the Standard Picture. With respect to the failure to make the distinction,
Mitchell Berman and Kevin Toh point out that "the relevant ambiguity [between the
linguistic content of the text and the content of the law] is close to ubiquitous in originalist
writing," and "in nonoriginalist writing too." Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, On What
Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 547
& n.11 (2013). I should emphasize that I am not suggesting that the actual practice of legal
interpretation reflects the Standard Picture. See Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note
2, at 72-81. My point is, rather, that when lawyers, judges, and law professors describe what
they are doing, many seem to assume the Standard Picture.
20. Where does the American Legal Realist movement fit in? Legal realism was an important
movement, but not really a participant in the debate over what determines the content of the
law; one main strand of realism largely took for granted the central positivist thesis. To
simplify greatly, legal realists accept the positivist understanding of what determines the
content of the law, but they take a much more pessimistic (or perhaps realistic) view of the
extent to which those sources of law are capable of yielding determinate legal norms. See
Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 65 n.31; Brian Leiter, Legal Realism and
Legal Positivism Reconsidered, III ETHICS 278 (2001). For discussion of the legal realists'
indeterminacy thesis and Dworkin's theory, see Mark Greenberg, Implications of
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depends, at the most fundamental level, only on social facts, understood as
non-normative, non-evaluative facts." But legal positivism does not specify
how social facts determine the content of the law. To say that the content of the
law is determined, at the most fundamental level, by social facts alone does not
yet tell us, for example, how statutes contribute to the content of the law. One
manifestation of this gap is that positivism by itself does not yield an account
of statutory interpretation -of how to discover a statute's contribution to the
content of the law. How do we get from the fact that a given statute was
enacted to the statute's contribution to the content of the law?
In general, it is a difficult problem to say how practices, decisions, and the
like determine unique norms. The Standard Picture offers what appears to be
an easy solution: the linguistic contents of the authoritative pronouncements
are the contents of the legal norms. Moreover, the solution 1) is intuitively
appealing to many (as noted, the idea that the law is what the texts say has
deep roots in ordinary thought), and 2) requires no appeal to moral or other
normative facts. Unsurprisingly, then, the Standard Picture is the standard
positivist view with respect to that issue." The Standard Picture yields the
Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II, 31 LAw & PHIL. 619,
629-38 (2012). Others might have taken the conclusion that the content of the law is
substantially indeterminate to be a reductio of the positivist premises, but the legal realists
embraced indeterminacy. See Mark Greenberg, Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy
ofLaw, 3o LAw&PHIL. 419, 441, 447 (2011).
21. Legal positivism is not monolithic; several characteristic positivist theses can be
distinguished. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 37-52 (1979); Jules Coleman,
Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982).
22. On this problem, see Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, supra note 2; Mark D. Greenberg &
Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 568, 613-17 (1998). See also
Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2.
23. I argue elsewhere that H.L.A. Hart's version of legal positivism, the most influential
position in contemporary philosophy of law, assumes the Standard Picture. See Greenberg,
The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 54-55, 6o-61, 69. I also provide other evidence that the
Standard Picture is taken for granted by many philosophers of law, including natural law or
anti-positivist theorists. See id. at 60-72. John Finnis, for example, seems to accept the
Standard Picture, holding that the content of the law is the content of authoritative
pronouncements. He then goes on to claim that such internally valid law is not legally
authoritative "in the focal sense" unless it is morally authoritative. JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 27 (1980). For a legal positivist position that rejects the Standard
Picture, see SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011). As he has explained in personal
communication, Shapiro holds that the content of the law is determined by the content of
certain plans, and he holds that the content of the relevant plans is not constituted by the
linguistic content of the planning texts (or the contents of the planners' intentions). One
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account of statutory interpretation, discussed in the Introduction, according to
which the interpretation of a statute is primarily a matter of extracting its
linguistic content - an account that would be accepted by most positivists.
The widespread assumption of the Standard Picture also plays a role in
explaining legal positivism's influence. Unlike positivism, the Standard Picture
is typically an implicit assumption that is rarely explicitly acknowledged or
defended -and, indeed, it is often assumed to be common ground.2 And the
widespread assumption of the Standard Picture biases the debate in favor of
legal positivism. Because the Standard Picture holds that the law is primarily
constituted by the contents of authoritative pronouncements, it leaves only a
limited role that morality could play. All of the anti-positivist options that,
given the Standard Picture, are most naturally taken to be available suffer from
obvious and serious problems.
This completes my introduction of the Standard Picture, the first of the
two dominant views to which my view is opposed. In sum, the Standard
Picture is widely taken for granted, and assumed to be common ground, by
contemporary philosophers of law (though it is rarely explicitly espoused). 6
The second main view is that of Ronald Dworkin, which, though well-
known and influential, is far less widely accepted than the Standard Picture.
Dworkin conceives of the law as an underlying, idealized source from which all
legal practices flow. More specifically, the content of the law is the set of
principles that best morally justifies past legal and political practices.2' Dworkin
reason for this is the role of "meta-interpretation" in constituting the content of the plans.
See id. at 331-87.
24. See Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 60-72.
25. See id. at 62-66. I do not mean to endorse the position that the only anti-positivist positions
consistent with the Standard Picture are obviously false. See id. at 65 n-32. My goal is rather
to explain why one who sees the law through the lens of the Standard Picture will tend to
find it difficult to see why anti-positivism would be at all attractive and would entirely miss
the possibility of anti-positivist positions such as Dworkin's or my own.
26. See Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 61-62 & nn.22-25.
27. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that Dworkin's view has been widely misunderstood
because legal theorists have taken for granted that the Standard Picture is common ground.
They have therefore wrongly taken Dworkin's view to be a perverse way of developing the
Standard Picture. In particular, they have taken Dworkinian interpretation to be a way of
working out the linguistic content of the legal texts. See id. at 64-65.
28. Dworkin sometimes formulates his theory to include in the content of the law not just the
principles but also propositions that follow from them. He does not explicate the relevant
notion of "following from," but presumably the idea is that the principles imply more
specific propositions. For example, the principle that no one can benefit from his or her own
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famously explicated the relevant kind of moral justification with his notions of
fit and justification.
wrong implies the proposition that one who murders a testator cannot inherit under the
will. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 15-20 (1986). The qualification about
propositions that follow from the principles does not affect the points I make in the text,
and I will omit it for simplicity.
Dworkin's flagship statement of his view is Law's Empire (1986). And many of the
ideas were first developed in Taking Rights Seriously (1977) and A Matter of Principle (1985).
Near the end of Justice for Hedgehogs (2011), however, Dworkin briefly suggests that he now
holds a very different view. See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 405-09 (2011).
The discussion is highly compressed, but one reading is that Dworkin's new position is that
the content of the law is that part of the moral profile that is created by the actions of legal
institutions and that the courts are morally obligated to enforce. In other words, on this
reading, the new position is a version of the Moral Impact Theory that restricts legal rights
and obligations to those that should be enforced by courts. Another reading, however, is
that the new position is simply that the content of the law is whatever the courts are morally
obligated to enforce: "Legal rights are those that people are entitled to enforce on demand,
without further legislative intervention, in adjudicative institutions that direct the executive
power of sheriff or police." Id. at 406. This latter position seems to be the view that Dworkin
adopts in his posthumous article, Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law,
41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2, 12 (2013). A serious problem with both positions is that they rule out
in principle the possibility of legal obligations that the courts and similar institutions-
because of, e.g., their institutional limitations, their relations with other branches of
government, and the like-should not enforce. For example, it is a familiar idea that the
President and Congress may have legal duties that the courts should not enforce. For a
powerful argument that constitutional law goes well beyond what the courts should enforce,
see Lawrence Gene Sager's classic article, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212 (1978). For Dworkin's response, which seems to
assume that his own account is correct, see DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra, at
412-13. Another problem with the appeal to what courts should enforce is that an account of
law should help us to explain why courts should enforce some rights and not others; we
therefore cannot appeal to what courts should enforce in order to explain what is law.
In personal conversations, Dworkin acknowledged the shift in his views. In the text,
when I refer to Dworkin's view, I mean the well-known view expounded in Law's Empire,
not the view Dworkin briefly suggests in his very late work.
29. See DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 28, at 45-275, esp. 284-86; RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977). I have argued that fit is best understood as one
aspect of justification. See Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, supra note 2, at 263 n-47.
Otherwise, Dworkin's account relies on two unrelated dimensions, one non-normative and
the other normative, and has no way of balancing them against each other. Perhaps because
of this problem, Dworkin often presented the view as holding that the law is the morally
best principle that meets some threshold level of fit. This version of the view is also
problematic, both because it has no principled way of determining what level of fit is
enough and because it gives such a large role to moral merit in determining the content of
the law. See infra note 34.
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The Moral Impact Theory, like Dworkin's theory and unlike the Standard
Picture, holds that the relation between legal practices and the law is a moral
one. But, unlike Dworkin's theory, the Moral Impact Theory holds that the law
is the moral impact or effect of certain actions of legal institutions - i.e., the
moral obligations that obtain in light of those actions-rather than the set of
principles that best justify them. To use a spatial metaphor, on the Moral
Impact Theory (as on the Standard Picture), the law is downstream of the legal
practices; on Dworkin's theory, by contrast, the law is upstream of the legal
practices. Figure i illustrates this contrast. 3o
Figure 1.
THE MORAL IMPACT THEORY CONTRASTED WITH DWORKIN'S THEORY OF LAW
The thick arrow represents moral justification, and the thin arrow represents moral consequence.
Principles - Legal Actions - Resulting Moral Obligations
The content of the law The content of the law according
according to Dworkin to the Moral Impact Theory
There are several other closely related differences between the Moral
Impact Theory and Dworkin's view. First, the Moral Impact Theory makes no
appeal to Dworkinian interpretation- that distinctive form of interpretation
according to which the basic question is which interpretation would make the
legal system the best it can be, or, more specifically, which principles best
morally justify the practices of the system. In fact, according to the Moral
The relevant notion of moral justification cannot be the ordinary one. On the ordinary
notion, for an action to be morally justified is for it to be supported or required by the
balance of reasons. Many of the actions taken by legal institutions are not supported or
required by the balance of reasons. Therefore, when Dworkin seeks the principles that best
justify all the past practices of a legal system, he is seeking principles that best justify actions
that are not in fact morally justified in the ordinary sense. Because the practices are often not
morally justified, the principles that best justify them will not in general be true moral
principles. Roughly, Dworkin's idea is that in trying to find the principles that best justify
the relevant practices, there is a trade-off between increasing the degree of fit and improving
the moral merit of the principles. I think that there are serious difficulties with how to
understand the relevant notion of moral justification, but this is a topic I cannot address
here.
30. One caveat about Figure 1: I do not mean to take a position on the idea of principles that
morally justify all legal actions. As noted supra note 29, I think that there are serious
difficulties with the relevant notion of moral justification.
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Impact Theory, working out the content of the law is not a genuinely
hermeneutic enterprise- rather, it involves straightforward moral reasoning
about the moral consequences of various facts and circumstances. Second,
according to the Moral Impact Theory, the content of the law is a subset of
what morality, taking into account all the relevant considerations, requires. By
contrast, there is no obvious reason why the set of principles that best morally
justifies the actual practices of a legal system would be a subset of what
morality requires. Certainly, Dworkin never argues for or even suggests any
such claim."1 On the face of it, one might expect that the principles that best fit
and justify the actual, often severely morally flawed, practices would be
principles that one should not follow, even given the existence of the legal
practices. And, in fact, Dworkin accepts that legal requirements may not be
moral requirements, indeed that law may be "too immoral to enforce."32
Finally, the Moral Impact Theory does not license an argument that because a
standard would be a morally good one ex ante, it is part of the content of the
law. On Dworkin's view, however, the fact that a principle is more morally
justified counts in favor of its being part of the content of the law; moreover, as
we saw with respect to the Smith example, whenever the competing candidate
principles fit roughly equally well, the fact that a principle is more morally
justified is decisive. In sum, though both the Moral Impact Theory and
Dworkin's theory afford morality an important role, they offer very different
accounts of the content of the law.
The three views considered here yield very different understandings of
legal interpretation as well. The Standard Picture holds that legal
interpretation involves answering the question: what is the linguistic content of
the legal texts? On this picture, there is little or no role for moral reasoning in legal
interpretation, except perhaps when the legal texts explicitly involve moral terms."
31. If Dworkin had believed that the set of principles that best justifies all of the practices of a
legal system coincides with what is morally required in light of the legal practices, it would
have been extremely strange for him not to have said so. Moreover, in that case, it would be
unclear what the point would be of introducing his distinctive account of legal
interpretation with its unusual notion of the principles that best justify the practices. See
supra note 29. He could simply have taken the straightforward view of the Moral Impact
Theory -that legal obligations are the moral obligations that come about as a result of the
actions of legal institutions.
32. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 28, at 262.
33. As discussed supra note 17, once the linguistic content of the legal texts has been extracted,
yielding legal norms, the Standard Picture does allow a secondary role for morality in, for
example, filtering or even filling gaps in the legal norms.
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On Dworkin's view, legal interpretation involves answering the question:
which principles best morally justify the legal practices? In terms of the heuristic
that Dworkin often used to explain his account of legal interpretation, it
involves finding the most morally justified interpretation that sufficiently well
fits the legal practices.34 The Moral Impact Theory rejects both understandings
of legal interpretation. It takes the question of legal interpretation to be: what
is morally required as a consequence of the lawmaking actions? And it does not
understand the universe of lawmaking actions to consist exclusively of issuing
texts. When the relevant actions do involve issuing texts, the linguistic content
of those texts is only one relevant consideration in the calculation of the moral
impact of the actions.
The prominence of the Standard Picture and the Dworkinian view may
make it seem that there is a stark choice: either legal interpretation does not
involve moral reasoning or it involves the kind of moral reasoning that
Dworkin spells out-moral reasoning directed at answering the question of
which candidate interpretation makes the legal system "the best it can be,"" to
use Dworkin's phrase. The Moral Impact Theory opens a third way: legal
interpretation involves moral reasoning about what is required as a
consequence of the relevant lawmaking actions.36
34. See DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 28, at 284-85, 387-88; DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY, supra note 29, at 340-42. I have argued that, contrary to the way Dworkin often
presented the view, the idea of a threshold of fit beyond which substantive moral
considerations take over should be regarded as merely a heuristic or expository device. See
Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, supra note 2, at 263 n.47. On what I take to be the better
view, finding the principles that best justify the practices involves a trade-off between fit and
justification. See supra note 29. This understanding would somewhat mitigate the directness
of Dworkin's reliance on the problematic idea that a principle can be law because it is
morally good. But, as pointed out in the text above, it is still the case that a principle's moral
merit counts in favor of its being part of the law. And when two candidate principles fit the
practices about equally well, moral goodness is decisive.
35. DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 28, at 379.
36. I contrasted the three accounts of statutory interpretation in the Introduction. In Part III, I
illustrate the implications of the Moral Impact Theory for legal interpretation in more detail.
In this Essay, my goal is to offer a theory of law-an explanation of how the
determinants make the content of the law what it is. I contrast my theory's account of
statutory interpretation with the accounts yielded by the Standard Picture and Dworkin's
theory because those are the dominant theories of law. There are, of course, many other
accounts of statutory interpretation, but most lack a theory of law, and I therefore don't
consider them. To take just one example, Justice Stephen Breyer's account of statutory and
constitutional interpretation advises us to take a variety of factors into account. See STEPHEN
BREYER, ACTIvE LIBERTY (20o6). But he does not offer a theory of law according to which
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I mentioned in the Introduction one reason that the Moral Impact Theory
is a natural position. We can now recognize several other, closely related
reasons. First, at least for many theorists, it is plausible that moral reasoning
has a place in legal interpretation. But, as mentioned above, it seems wrong to
think that the relevant kind of moral reasoning is moral reasoning concerning
which interpretation of a legal text would be ex ante morally preferable. The
Moral Impact Theory's account of statutory interpretation allows a role for
moral reasoning that is more procedural. We ask about the moral implication
of the fact that, say, the legislature enacted a statute or a court decided a
controversy in a particular way, not about which interpretation of the statute or
judicial opinion would be morally best. As we will see, the fact that a legal
institution acted in a particular way can, along with background circumstances,
change our moral obligations-for example, making participation in a
particular scheme morally obligatory, despite the fact that the scheme is
seriously morally flawed.
Second, legal systems treat legal obligations as genuinely binding
obligations that are generated by the legal institutions. The Moral Impact
Theory vindicates this treatment. It maintains that the legal obligations are the
genuinely binding obligations that are generated by the legal institutions. By
contrast, on the Standard Picture, the legal obligations are simply constituted
by the linguistic contents of the pronouncements of legal institutions. In
general, there is no reason to think that such "obligations" are genuinely
binding. For similar reasons, legal positivists have struggled to explain the use
of the term legal obligation. For example, influential positivists have argued that
to say that there is a legal obligation is to say that, from the perspective of the
legal system, there is a moral obligation. 7 The account thus denies the
commonsense view that a legal obligation is a kind of obligation at all. For, on
this view, it can be true that one has a legal obligation despite the fact that one
has no obligation (as long as the legal system takes one to have a moral
obligation).
Third, the Moral Impact Theory makes it easy to explain our dominating
concern with law. We generally treat the law not merely as one relevant
consideration among many, but as a central concern, indeed as excluding the
these factors have the corresponding role in determining the content of the law. That is, he
does not argue that we should give a particular consideration a certain relevance in
interpreting a statute because that consideration in fact has that relevance in determining the
content of the law.
37. See SHAPIRO, supra note 23, at 185-88; see also JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NoRMs
171-77 (1975).
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relevance of other considerations. It is easy to understand why we would have
such interest in the moral consequences of the legal practices. If the legal
institutions change what we are obligated to do, it is vital to work out that
change. By contrast, it is much less easy to understand why we would be
interested in identifying the principles that best justify the legal practices (or
that make them the best they can be). More precisely, although we might be
interested in such principles, for example because of the value of principled
consistency, they would be merely one relevant consideration in reaching
practical judgments.
A similar point applies to the Standard Picture. The ordinary meaning of
the legal texts is obviously a relevant consideration in practical deliberation, but
it is hard to see why it would deserve the central and exclusive focus of
attention that the Standard Picture gives it. This point is even stronger than it
might at first appear because, as noted above, there are typically multiple
different types of linguistic and mental content associated with each
authoritative legal text. In the case of a statute, for example, there is the
semantic content of the text, what the legislature intended to communicate,
what the legislature asserted, what the legislature presupposed and implicated,
what the legislature would reasonably be taken to have intended to
communicate, what legal effect the legislature intended to achieve, and so on.
Proponents of the Standard Picture typically assume that, without appeal to
moral considerations, one type of content can be identified as the one that
constitutes the content of the law.39 But it is unclear why we should be
exclusively concerned with one such content. On the Moral Impact Theory, all
of the linguistic and mental contents associated with the legal texts are among
the factors that are potentially relevant to our obligations. They-and other
morally relevant factors - are given whatever relevance they in fact deserve.
3s. See Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?, supra note 2, at 230-33, 241-50.
3g. See id. at 222-26, 229-30; Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 42-55, 63-66. I
argue that linguistic considerations are inadequate to determine which of those linguistic
contents is the relevant one for legal purposes. Nonlinguistic considerations, such as moral
ones, have to be introduced in order to adjudicate between the competing linguistic
contents. To make things worse, once we introduce such considerations, they often support
other candidates for the content of the law that are not linguistic contents of the relevant
texts. See Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?, supra note 2; Greenberg, The
Communication Theory of Legal Interpretation and Objective Notions of Communicative Content
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 10-135, 2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1726524.
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II. THE THEORY
In this Part, I develop the Moral Impact Theory in three stages. Section A
makes a few preliminary clarifications and refinements. Section B explains, via
several examples, how legal institutions can change our moral obligations,
thereby creating legal obligations. Finally, Section C clarifies how the theory
distinguishes legal obligations from other moral obligations.
We can begin with a rough and incomplete formulation of the theory:
The Moral Impact Theory (version 1): The legal obligations are those
moral obligations created by the actions of legal institutions.
On my view, legal institutions take various kinds of actions, such as voting
on bills and deciding cases, that change our moral obligations. The resulting
moral obligations are our legal obligations.
A. Preliminary Clarifications and Refinements
1. What Do I Mean by Moral Obligations?
My usage of the term moral is relatively standard, but, because the term is
used in various ways, I offer brief clarification. The relevant obligations -the
ones that, according to my theory, are legal obligations -are simply genuine,
all-things-considered, practical obligations.
Let me take the italicized terms in reverse order. First, the relevant
obligations are practical ones -i.e., obligations that concern what one should
do, as opposed to what one should think or feel.40 Thus, for example, we are
not concerned with epistemic obligations, which concern the formation and
revision of beliefs. (The law of evidence does not concern what the finder of
fact should believe, but rather concerns such questions as what evidence may
be presented to the finder of fact and what evidence the finder of fact may
consider.)
Second, the relevant obligations are all-things-considered obligations, as
opposed to merely pro tanto ones. If one makes a promise to pick up a friend at
the airport, and one's mother becomes severely ill, then taking all of the
40. I am using the term practical here in a relatively narrow sense to concern only questions of
what to do. In a broader sense, practical questions would include questions of what to feel
or what sort of character to have. Thanks to David Plunkett for suggesting clarification here.
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relevant considerations into account, one should not pick up the friend at the
airport. The obligation may still exist, and consequently one might be morally
required to apologize or to make up for its breach. In a terminology that has
become standard, we can say that the obligation to pick up the friend is, in
light of the mother's illness, merely a pro tanto obligation. By contrast, an all-
things-considered obligation is one that, taking all relevant considerations into
account, one should fulfill.41
Third, the point of saying that the relevant obligations are genuine is not
that there are two types of obligations, genuine ones and non-genuine ones.
Rather, the point is to distinguish my usage from what we might call the
sociological sense of the term "obligation" (and of other normative terms such
as "reason," "right," and so on). To say that a group has an obligation to
perform some action in the sociological sense is to say, roughly, that members
of the group believe that they have such an obligation (and perhaps have other
relevant attitudes and tendencies, such as disapproval of people who do not
perform the action in question). An anthropologist might say, for example,
that for a particular group it is obligatory (in the sociological sense) to follow
particular dietary laws. 42 The fact that members of a group believe that
something is obligatory obviously does not imply that they have any genuine
obligation. For instance, the fact that a cult believes that it is obligatory to
sacrifice one's firstborn child does not imply that this action is obligatory. On
41. The Moral Impact Theory is a work in progress, and the claim that the relevant moral
obligations are all-things-considered, rather than pro tanto, moral obligations is probably
the aspect of the theory that I advance most tentatively. I am tempted by an alternative
version of the theory, on which whatever pro tanto moral obligations come about in the
appropriate way-the legally proper way-would be legal obligations. (On the important idea
of the legally proper way, see infra Section II.B.) Some of these obligations would be merely
pro tanto, not bottom-line, legal obligations. (Bottom-line legal obligations are those that,
after taking into account all of the relevant legal considerations, have not been overridden or
outweighed. For example, one who escaped from prison to avoid being burned to death in a
fire may breach a pro tanto legal obligation but not a bottom-line legal obligation. In normal
parlance, legal obligation is used for bottom-line legal obligations.) On this alternative
version of the theory, conflicts between pro tanto legal obligations would be resolved in
accordance with what the underlying moral considerations, on balance, require. See infra
Part IV. The obligations that win out would be the bottom-line legal obligations. These
legal obligations might not be all-things-considered moral obligations; they could be
overridden or outweighed by other moral considerations. I am grateful to Selim Berker,
Barbara Herman, Scott Hershovitz, David Plunkett, and Scott Shapiro for discussion of
these issues.
42. To avoid confusion, I will not use "obligation" (or other normative terms) in the
sociological sense.
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my theory, what matters is not whether people believe that they have certain
obligations, but whether they actually do.43
In my view, genuine, all-things-considered, practical obligations are all-
things-considered moral obligations."' I therefore will often refer to such
obligations as moral obligations. (For brevity, I generally omit the qualification
all-things-considered.)
2. The Moral Profile
As a shorthand, I have been writing of obligations. But the content of the
law includes more than just obligations. For example, it includes powers,
privileges, and perhaps permissions. When I write about the way in which
legal institutions change our moral obligations, I mean to include the way in
which they change our moral obligations, powers, privileges, and so on. I have
coined the term moral profile to cover all of these, but, for convenience, I
sometimes write "moral obligations" or just "obligations."45 With this
clarification, the theory can be reformulated more precisely:
43. There will sometimes be controversy over whether particular putative obligations are
genuine. The existence of such controversy does not make the notion of genuine obligation
problematic-any more than controversy over which beliefs are true makes the notion of a
true belief problematic. Indeed, as Ronald Dworkin was fond of pointing out in discussion,
in a typical disagreement about what people are obligated to do, both sides agree that
genuine obligations exist; the disagreement concerns the content of the obligations. There
are difficult questions about what makes it the case that, for example, someone has a
particular obligation, but we need not address such questions for purposes of this paper.
Talk of genuine obligations does not presuppose any particular metaethical view, for
example objectivism or subjectivism about morality.
Some theorists maintain that there are no genuine obligations (reasons, rights, and so
on). This is not the place to address such radical moral -indeed normative -skepticism. In
this Essay, I assume what most of us take for granted in our daily lives -that there are
reasons for performing some actions rather than others, obligations to do certain things and
not to do others, and so on. Although I cannot argue against normative skepticism here, it is
worth noting that much of our concern with law presupposes that such skepticism is false.
On the skeptical view, people have interests and desires and wield raw power, but there is
no reason to be concerned with unfairness, inequality, cruelty, or injustice.
44. What matters is that, on my view, legal obligations are genuine, all-things-considered,
practical obligations. As noted in the text, I think such obligations are moral. But one who is
an error theorist about morality specifically but has no quarrel with genuine practical
normativity can still accept the essence of my view. For extended discussion and
qualification of a closely related point, see Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at
81-84.
45. For the term moral profile, see id. at 56-57.
1308
123:1288 2014
THE MORAL IMPACT THEORY OF LAW
The Moral Impact Theory (version 2): The content of law is that part of
the moral profile created by the actions of legal institutions.
3. Legal Texts Versus Legal Standards
It will be important to distinguish different uses of the term law. As a mass
noun, law can refer to the content of law or to the legal system. As a count
noun, a law can refer either to an authoritative legal text (such as a statute or
ordinance or a provision thereof) or to a legal standard, requirement, rule, or
principle. It is this latter distinction that I want to emphasize here.46 An
authoritative legal text is a linguistic entity. By contrast, a legal standard is a
norm. Texts and norms are fundamentally different kinds of things. A text may
express a norm, just as a numeral may express a number or a sentence may
express a thought. But a text is no more a norm than the Roman numeral "W"
is the number four or than the sentence "c'est la vie" is the thought that that's
life. (If the distinction is not immediately evident, consider the moral case. No
one would confuse the moral norm against causing unnecessary suffering with
a sentence or text.) Moreover, it is a substantive claim that the issuance of an
authoritative text makes it the case that a legal norm corresponding to the
linguistic content of the text obtains.47 Indeed, it is the central thesis of the
Standard Picture.
Despite the obviousness of the distinction, legal practitioners and scholars
habitually use terms such as statute and provision interchangeably with terms
such as rule and standard. The prevalence of the Standard Picture explains these
habits. On the Standard Picture, although texts are not norms, there will be a
relatively straightforward correspondence between texts and norms.45
The Moral Impact Theory is an account of how actions of legal institutions,
including importantly the issuance of authoritative texts, make it the case that
legal norms obtain. And, according to the Moral Impact Theory, the relation
between texts and norms will be more complex than the Standard Picture
would have it.4 Although using terms for legal texts and legal norms
46. On the distinction, see also id. at 66-67.
47. See Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?, supra note 2, at 219.
48. See Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 66-67. As I say there, I don't mean to
suggest that legal scholars are confused about the difference between texts and rules. Id. at
67 n.34-
49. Even on the Moral Impact Theory, there will tend to be rough correlations between
statutory provisions and legal norms. See id. at 59.
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interchangeably is harmless in many contexts, in the present context it will be
important to distinguish carefully between statutes and norms. To avoid
confusion, I will be careful to use statute, provision, and the like exclusively for
texts, and to use standard, norm, and the like exclusively for norms. And I will
not use law as a count noun without explicit clarification.
B. How Legal Institutions Change the Moral Profile
How can legal institutions like legislatures and courts change our moral
obligations? On the Standard Picture, legal institutions issue authoritative legal
pronouncements -statutes, judicial decisions, and the like-the linguistic
content of which becomes the content of the law simply in virtue of the fact
that it was authoritatively pronounced. We can express this idea by saying that,
on the Standard Picture, authoritative legal pronouncements change our legal
obligations directly."o This change in legal obligations may, depending on the
circumstances, affect moral obligations. Thus, on the Standard Picture, the
standard way for legal institutions to change our moral obligations is by
directly changing our legal obligations (by issuing authoritative legal
pronouncements).
On the Moral Impact Theory, by contrast, the idea is not that legal
institutions change the moral profile by changing the content of the law. Any
such suggestion would be viciously circular given that, according to my theory,
the changes in the content of the law brought about by the legal institutions are
to be explained by the changes in the moral profile brought about by the legal
institutions. Instead, the idea is that legal institutions change our moral
obligations by changing the relevant circumstances (and not by doing so via
changes in the content of the law). There are many different tools that legal
institutions can use to bring about such changes in the moral profile.
I can best explain with examples. I use them to illustrate ways in which
legal institutions can change our moral obligations by changing the relevant
circumstances, thus creating legal obligations. The crucial point is that the
examples do not involve changing the moral profile by changing the content of
5o. For extensive discussion of the relevant sense of directness, see id. at 44-51. The main point
is that, according to the Standard Picture, a legally authoritative pronouncement explains
the validity of a legal norm without explanatory intermediaries- that is, not by explaining
something else which then explains the norm's validity. As I explain, the absence of
explanatory intermediaries is consistent with the possibility that the making of an
authoritative pronouncement is not sufficient for the corresponding norm's being legally
valid.
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the law, but, rather, changing the content of the law by changing the moral
profile. I will come back to this point about the direction of explanation
below.5'
First, the establishment of a legal system and the actions of legal
institutions in maintaining security and punishing wrongdoers can make it
morally impermissible to use violence. Without a legal system, it may be
morally permissible for people to use violence against others who attack or
threaten to attack them or their families or allies. Indeed, it may be morally
permissible for people to use violence against others who are endangering their
well-being in other ways, for example by taking food or water on which they
rely. By maintaining a monopoly on the use of force, effectively protecting
people against violence, and reliably punishing wrongdoers, a legal system can
make violence morally impermissible, except in a very narrow range of
circumstances. Notice that, in this example, actions of legal institutions other
than the issuance of texts play an important role in improving the moral
situation.
Second, given the great moral importance of advance notice of punishment
and the indeterminacy- or at least uncertainty -with respect to what
punishment is morally appropriate, the punishment of wrongdoers is in
general morally problematic without action by legal institutions." A legal
system plausibly can make punishment morally permissible by giving notice of
which morally wrong acts are punishable and what the corresponding
punishments will be.
Third, in the punishment example, the actions of legal institutions are able
to make determinate and knowable aspects of morality that are otherwise either
relatively indeterminate or uncertain. There are many other cases of this and
related phenomena. For example, it is clear that agents who break at least some
promises have resulting obligations to the promisee, but there is a great deal of
uncertainty about what sorts of remedial actions are appropriate with respect to
different promises, and it is plausible that there are frequently a variety of
different ways in which the remedial obligations can be met.53 Once the legal
system provides certain contract remedies, however, people who make
promises act against that background, and this can render determinate and
certain or otherwise change what is morally required in the event of breach.
51. See infra text accompanying and following note 63.
52. As is standard, I am distinguishing punishment from the use of force to defend myself or
others from an imminent threat.
s3. See Seana Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARv. L. REV. 708 (2007).
1311
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The case of accidental breach is a nice example. Ex ante, it is unclear and
perhaps indeterminate what remedy is morally required if one breaches a
promise accidentally. The actions of legal institutions make the remedy for
accidental breach of a legally binding promise clear and determinate.54
Fourth, consider the familiar example of a coordination problem.5 It is
sometimes important that all or nearly all people act in the same way, though
there are several equally good ways in which everyone could act. It is
important, for example, that everyone use electrical outlets that meet the same
specifications, though there are many different specifications that would work
equally well. Suppose a legislature directs everyone to adopt a particular
solution. In the simplest kind of case, this action by the legislature may well
have the effect of making the specified solution more salient than the others. As
a result, given the moral reasons for following the solution that most other
people are likely to follow, everyone may now have a moral obligation to adopt
the specified solution.
Matters may be more complicated, however. Because of a wide variety of
factors - established practices in the relevant industry, early misunderstandings
of the legislation by a particularly influential company or by government
inspectors, basic features of human psychology, new technological
developments not predictable when the legislature acted, and so on-the result
of the legislature's action may be that a solution that is somewhat different
from the one specified by the legislature becomes the most salient one. That
solution may therefore come to be morally obligatory, despite the fact that it
does not correspond to the linguistic content of the statute.
In both kinds of cases, the legislature has changed the moral profile,
creating a new moral obligation. On my account, this new moral obligation
counts as a legal obligation because of the way in which it came about.
Fifth, to the extent that people have the ability to participate equally in
governance, legal institutions can harness democratic considerations to alter
the moral landscape. Promises and agreements are a useful analogy. By making
promises and entering into agreements, people change their moral obligations.
The fact of agreement has moral force. Even if what was agreed on is an
arrangement that is seriously morally flawed-a different arrangement would
54. Thanks to Seana Shiffrin for this example. On other ways in which the law makes the
remedies more determinate, see id. at 720-21 & n.17.
ss. There is a vast literature on coordination problems. For seminal discussions, see DAVID
LEWIS, CONVENTION (2002); and THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).
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have been much fairer, for example -the fact that the arrangement was agreed
on may be sufficient to create a moral obligation.
Similarly, the fact that a decision is reached by a procedure that is part of a
system of governance in which everyone has an equal opportunity to
participate has moral force. I don't mean to suggest that people are morally
bound by any decision of a legal institution in a democratically constituted
government. But to the extent that self-government results in an arrangement,
there are moral reasons for people to abide by the arrangement. I will generally
refer to such moral reasons as "democratic considerations," "reasons of
democracy," or the like.
It is a complex matter what democratic considerations support. It certainly
cannot be assumed that democratic considerations always translate into some
simple formula, such as whatever a popularly elected legislature intended.s" For
example, there are familiar ways in which legislatures fail to be accountable to
the public.57
According to the Moral Impact Theory, the relevance of democratic
considerations does not derive from the history and traditions of our legal
system. It is not, for example, that we are seeking principles that fit and justify
our practices, and, because those practices happen to be democratic, the
relevant principles turn out to be democratic. Rather, it is a general moral truth
that, to the extent that people have equal opportunity to participate in
procedures of governance, they acquire moral reasons to comply with the
decisions that are reached through those procedures. Democratic
56. Mitchell Berman provides an astute discussion of problems with arguments that democracy
(as well as other values) straightforwardly implies that the Constitution must be interpreted
in accordance with its original meaning. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 69-75 (2009).
57. For discussion of some democratic failings of legislatures, see Hillel Y. Levin, Contemporary
Meaning and Expectations in Statutory Interpretation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1103, 1134. For
nuanced accounts of what democracy supports with respect to constitutional interpretation,
see CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2001); and
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
(2004). It is worth noting that, contrary to what is sometimes assumed, the obligation that a
promise generates may not correspond exactly to the linguistic content of the promise. For
discussion, see Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?, supra note 2, at 238-39. Bernard
Williams may have something like this in mind when he says: "[P]romises in informal
contexts are less than contracts: neither the agent nor the recipient need fall back on every
word of what was originally understood." BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS:
AN ESSAY IN GENEALOGY 112 (2002). (In my view, the situation with respect to contracts is
more complex than Williams's comment implies.)
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considerations therefore are relevant in all legal systems, not just those with
democratic traditions. Of course, to the extent that a legal system is part of a
system of government that does not allow people to participate, it will not be
effective at harnessing democratic considerations.
It is worth noting that, as with agreements, democratic considerations can
provide moral support for seriously morally flawed arrangements. The fact that
the democratic process has settled on a particular scheme provides reasons for
compliance with that scheme, even if the scheme is far from the best scheme
that could have been chosen.
I want to emphasize that, in appealing to democratic considerations, I do
not mean to suggest that there is a general moral obligation to comply with
directives of popularly elected representatives in the circumstances of
contemporary nations. There is a widespread consensus that there is no such
general moral obligation, and I think that the consensus is correct." Indeed, I
have elsewhere argued that one of the attractions of my account of law is that it
explains how legal systems can generate morally binding obligations despite
the fact that there is no general moral obligation to obey directives from legal
authorities.59 Although there is no such general moral obligation, democratic
considerations can reinforce other factors of the sort that my examples
illustrate, yielding moral obligations in particular cases. For example, in the
case of a coordination problem, the fact that the solution was democratically
chosen may add democratic considerations to the other considerations, such as
salience, supporting the solution. In general, in real cases, the different kinds of
considerations illustrated by the examples often reinforce each other.
Sixth, legal institutions can create moral obligations to participate in
specific schemes for the public good, such as paying taxes. Without a legal
system, people will have general moral obligations to help others. But there
will often be no moral obligation to give any particular amount of money to
any particular scheme. For one thing, especially when it comes to problems of
any complexity, many different possible schemes are likely to be beneficial, and
the efforts of many people are needed for a scheme to make a difference.
Nothing determines which possible scheme is the one that people should
participate in. In addition, there is no mechanism for people to participate in
one common scheme. By specifying a particular scheme and making it salient,
creating the mechanism for everyone to participate in that scheme, and
ensuring that others will not free-ride, legal institutions can channel the pre-
5s. See Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 99-oo.
s9. See id. at 84-102.
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existing, relatively open-ended, moral obligations into a moral obligation to
pay a specified amount of money into that scheme.6o
Again, the moral obligation that legal institutional action brings about may
be to participate in a scheme that is seriously morally flawed. Suppose that it is
very important to have some mechanism in place for solving a particular
problem, for example, preventing violence or ensuring clean drinking water.
Then, if a particular solution has the best chance of being implemented, it may
be morally required to do one's part in that scheme even if it is significantly
worse than-for example, more unjust than-the ex ante best solution to the
problem. The fact that legal institutions are implementing a particular scheme
can make it the case that that scheme has the best chance of being adopted and
therefore that it is morally obligatory. Similarly, once a particular morally
flawed rule has been widely adopted and relied on, it may be unfair not to
follow it. What legal institutions actually do, not merely the linguistic content
of their pronouncements, can therefore play an important role. And, as in the
case of a coordination problem, the scheme that becomes morally obligatory as
a result of legal institutional action may not be one that corresponds to the
linguistic content of any pronouncement.
In certain kinds of situations, however, the linguistic content of directives
will be morally binding. Court orders directed at specific individuals are a good
example. Because of the overwhelming moral importance of having a way of
ending disputes peacefully, there are powerful moral reasons to give binding
force to such specific orders."'
I should emphasize that I am not suggesting that making a particular
scheme salient, creating a mechanism for participation, and preventing free-
riding are necessarily sufficient to create the relevant moral obligation. It will
depend on all the circumstances. A corresponding caveat applies more
generally across the examples.
Seventh, the point about the legal system's ability to ensure participation is
of great general importance. In many situations, one person's taking action
toward some community benefit will be worthless, or nearly so, without the
actions of many others. In such cases, if there is no reasonable expectation that
6o. See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 45 (1986). Raz uses the example in developing
his account of authority. I do not mean to suggest that the new moral obligation replaces the
pre-existing moral obligations. People will continue to have relatively open-ended moral
duties, such as a duty of beneficence. Thanks to Barbara Herman for pressing me to clarify
this point.
61. See infra Section IV.B.
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others will cooperate, there is likely no moral requirement that a particular
person should participate. By using the threat of coercion, legal institutions can
ensure the participation of others, thus removing this obstacle to a moral
obligation to participate.
Eighth, and finally, the adjudication of cases is another way in which legal
actors can change the moral profile. The considerations relevant to the impact
of a judicial decision on the moral profile are complex. I will briefly explicate
these considerations by sketching how the actual practice of interpreting
appellate case law can be explained as the result of the interaction between
them. 62
To begin with, note that on the Standard Picture, working out an appellate
decision's contribution to the law should be a matter of identifying an
authoritative text-which might be only some portion of the judicial opinion-
and then extracting its linguistic content. Indeed, at least once the relevant text
is identified, interpreting appellate decisions should be no different from
interpreting statutes.
Our actual practice is very different. The standards that appellate courts
announce and the reasoning that they offer are given substantial attention, but
they are far from the end of the story. In deciding how to resolve a new case in
light of a past decision (or decisions), a past decision can be distinguished by
pointing out that the present case has relevantly different facts, even if the
present case falls within the standard apparently announced by the court in the
past case. Moreover, the standards announced in the past case can be treated as
nonbinding dicta on the ground that they go beyond what was necessary for
resolution of the case.
According to the Moral Impact Theory, considerations of fairness support
treating like cases alike, so the fact that a case is resolved in a particular way
provides a reason for treating relevantly similar cases in the same way in the
future. To the extent that we must treat like cases alike, the resolution of cases
will generate standards that affect the proper resolution of future cases. On the
other hand, at least for many kinds of issues, democratic considerations favor
the creation of standards by representative bodies such as legislatures. Thus,
there is an apparent tension between these two kinds of considerations.
But treating like cases alike does not warrant privileging the way in which
the court explains its decision or the standards that it announces. What matters
with respect to treating like cases alike is whether future cases are in fact
62. See also Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 73-75.
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relevantly similar to the past case, and that is a moral question, not a question
of what the court in the past case said. Therefore, treating past decisions as
governing only relevantly similar cases - through the practices of
distinguishing past decisions and treating the announcement of rules as dicta -
can be seen as a way of reconciling the value of treating like cases alike with
democratic considerations that militate against courts' creating general
standards.
The situation is more complicated, however. Depending on the legal
system's practices with respect to precedent, the court's reasoning and any
standard that it announces may create expectations and, for that reason, engage
fairness considerations. Moreover, even though a court does not represent the
interests of constituents in the way that a legislature does, democratic values
having to do with public deliberation give weight to a court's public offering of
reasons in support of a standard. Thus, these other aspects of fairness and
democracy explain the careful attention given to past courts' explanations of
their decisions.
This concludes my discussion of ways in which legal institutions can
change the moral profile. I emphasize two points about the examples. First,
even when, as is typical, the relevant action includes the issuance of some kind
of text, the content of the law is not determined simply by the meaning of the
text. Rather, the content of the law depends on the moral significance of the
fact that the legal institution took the action in question (including the issuance
of the text). Judicial decisions illustrate this point well.
Second, in the examples, various kinds of action by government officials,
not just pronouncements, alter the moral profile. The examples involve, among
other things, the actions of legal officials in setting up actual mechanisms for
collecting taxes, protecting people from violence, and taking or threatening
enforcement action against shirkers to enforce people's participation in
collective schemes.
As noted, my examples involve actions by legal officials. But how does the
legal system instigate appropriate action by officials? If the legal system gets
legal officials to act by instructing them to do so, and if such instructions
generate legal obligations to act as instructed, then does my account tacitly
assume at least some part of the Standard Picture's understanding of how legal
obligations are generated?
This objection is off target. A preliminary point is that officials often do not
need to be specifically instructed how to act. Legislators propose legislation,
vote on bills, and so on without legal instructions specifying what legislators
are to do. Similarly, courts and executive officials take a wide range of actions
without specific instructions.
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More importantly, although authoritative pronouncements, such as
statutes, regulations, and executive orders, are an important part of the way in
which a legal system gets officials to act, this use of authoritative
pronouncements is not in tension with my theory. As noted above, for familiar
reasons, ordinary citizens in contemporary nations, even democratic ones, do
not have a general moral obligation to do what the legislature or other legal
institutions command. Government officials are an important exception,
however. The moral obligation of officials is generally overdetermined. They
have explicitly consented to the government, have voluntarily assumed an
obligation to carry out the instructions of their superiors, and have accepted
benefits that they could easily have declined. Therefore, unlike the situation
with respect to ordinary citizens, the legal system can typically generate moral
obligations of government officials simply by specifying what they are required
to do. And those moral obligations, on my account, are legal obligations.
Even in such circumstances, however, the Moral Impact Theory affords
authoritative pronouncements a role that is crucially different from the one
envisioned by the Standard Picture. According to the Standard Picture, legal
obligations come about simply because the relevant content is authoritatively
pronounced. By contrast, on the Moral Impact Theory, when circumstances
obtain in which authoritative pronouncements are capable of generating
corresponding moral obligations, the pronouncements change the content of
the law via a change in the moral profile. For example, an executive order
directing legal officials to act generates a moral obligation for those officials to
act accordingly. This moral obligation comes about not simply because the
order was authoritatively issued, but also because of the morally relevant
background circumstances -for example, that the officials have voluntarily
assumed an obligation to obey, have accepted benefits, and so on. The
consequent moral obligation is a legal obligation, so the explanation of the
legal obligation goes through the relevant moral considerations.
More generally, there are special circumstances in which commands do
generate moral obligations to do what is commanded. That the person
commanded is an official of the legal system is simply one such special
circumstance. When the relevant circumstances obtain, authoritative
pronouncements provide a shortcut for a legal system. The legal system can use
such pronouncements to generate moral obligations-and these moral
obligations, according to the Moral Impact Theory, are themselves legal
63. On the consensus that there is no such general moral obligation, see Greenberg, The
Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 99-101.
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obligations. In sum, legal systems can use diverse tools to generate moral
obligations. Those tools include, under appropriate circumstances,
authoritative pronouncements.*6
I hope that the examples have clarified the point that I highlighted earlier
about the direction of explanation. It is not that a legislature or court pronounces
a norm, which thereby becomes a valid legal norm, and, because of moral
reasons for obeying the law, ultimately gives rise to a genuine (moral) obligation.
The order of explanation between the legal obligations and the moral obligations
is reversed in my account: the legislature votes or the court decides a case, thus
possibly creating genuine obligations through the kinds of mechanisms I have
been illustrating. Those genuine obligations then are legal obligations.
The examples also are suggestive of what law and legal systems, by their
nature, are supposed to do or are for.6 s In many of the examples, it would be
better if people's obligations were different from what they in fact are, and the
actions of legal institutions have the potential to improve matters by changing
the relevant circumstances, thus changing moral obligations. As mentioned in
the Introduction, my view (which I do not argue for in this Essay) is that it is
part of the nature of law that a legal system is supposed to improve our moral
situation in the kind of way that I have described -not, of course, that legal
systems always improve our moral situation, but that they are defective as legal
systems to the extent that they do not.
C. Clarifying Which Moral Obligations Are Legal Obligations
Thus far, I have written informally of that part of the moral profile created
by legal institutions. We need to do more to pin down which moral obligations
are legal obligations.
1. Pre-Existing Moral Obligations
In some instances, legal norms have content that is the same as, or at least
similar to, that of pre-existing moral norms. For example, the criminal law
64. For discussion of the special case of particularized orders (ones directed at particular
individuals), such as an order issued by a court after a final judgment, directing a particular
individual to pay a particular sum of money, see infra Section IV.B.
65. For elaboration of the idea that it can be part of the nature of law that legal systems are
supposed to play a certain role, though actual legal systems often fail to do so, see
Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 86-89.
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includes many legal obligations, such as obligations not to harm or kill other
people, that have content closely related to moral norms that exist
independently of the law. Thus, it might be thought that the relevant moral
obligations are not created by the actions of legal institutions and therefore are
not legal obligations. In that case, the Moral Impact Theory would have the
consequence that some of what we take to be paradigmatic legal obligations,
such as the obligation not to kill, are not legal obligations at all.
The needed refinement is that we must understand "that part of the moral
profile created by the actions of legal institutions" to include obligations that
are altered or reinforced by the actions of legal institutions. (Rather than
rewording the official statement of the theory, I will simply stipulate this
clarification.)
I begin with obligations that are altered. When a legislature enacts a
criminal prohibition on conduct that is already morally prohibited, the
legislature's action typically alters the content of the obligation.6 6 There are at
least two kinds of alterations in content-changes in the first-order content of
the obligation, and changes in the remedies available in case of a violation.
Consider the case of statutory rape. Before action by legal institutions, the
content of the moral prohibition will be relatively vague, perhaps something
along the lines of: sex with children is prohibited. Once the legal institutions
have acted, the content of the prohibition will typically be much more precise.
For example, the actions of the legislature may result in a precise age of
consent. The content may become more precise in various other ways, for
example, with respect to whether the prohibition applies to everyone or only to
adults, whether the sex of the victim and perpetrator matter, whether there are
exceptions for marriage, and so on.
Next, legislative action will also typically alter the remedies or punishments
for a violation of an obligation. Morality tends to be rather vague about
remedies. In the case of punishment, perhaps morality says that a punishment
must be proportional to the wrong, but offers little precise detail about what
punishments would be proportional to specific wrongs. Indeed, as I suggested
above, in part because of this indeterminacy, punishment is in general morally
problematic without action by legal institutions. An important way in which
legislation alters pre-existing moral obligations is therefore by making
66. The term altered may be misleading. The original, relatively vague moral prohibition will
often remain in force. On the other hand, a reason for using the term is that the pre-legal
moral reasons are part of the explanation of the new prohibition. Thanks to Scott
Hershovitz for pressing me to clarify this point.
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determinate the appropriate punishments for violations of those obligations. (I
address below the related issue of eliminating uncertainty about moral
obligations that are in fact determinate.) Legislation can thus make it morally
permissible to punish violators.67
In addition to altering pre-existing moral obligations, a legislative
enactment of a criminal prohibition (on conduct that is already morally
prohibited) typically results in new reasons for not engaging in the relevant
conduct. The examples discussed above are relevant here. For example, the
legislative action will often add reasons of fairness and democracy to the pre-
existing moral reasons. When reasons are added for engaging in conduct that is
already obligatory, let us say that the pre-existing obligations are reinforced."8
The Moral Impact Theory holds that moral obligations that are reinforced by
the actions of legal institutions are among the moral obligations that are legal
obligations.
2. The Legally Proper Way
The next refinement of the theory is that legal obligations are not just any
moral obligations that are created by the actions of legal institutions. We need
to limit the relevant moral obligations to ones that come about in the
appropriate way -what I call the legally proper way.6 9 We have an intuitive
understanding of the legally proper way for a legal system to generate
obligations, and we can articulate it theoretically by appealing to what legal
systems are for or are supposed to do. Let me explain. Suppose a government
persecutes a particular minority group. This persecution may include directives
to harm members of that group or to deny them benefits. Such government
67. Scott Hershovitz argues that the new obligation (the criminal law obligation) is to the state,
and that is why it is permissible to punish violators. See Scott Hershovitz, The Authority of
Law, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 65 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012).
On that view, all criminal law obligations differ from the pre-existing moral obligations on
the dimension of to whom the obligation is owed.
68. The obligations may be strengthened as a result. But, in my stipulative use of the term, to
say that the obligations are reinforced is neutral with respect to whether the obligations are
strengthened. Adding reasons against engaging in certain conduct can also have the salutary
epistemic effect of dispelling uncertainty about the existence of an obligation, one that
already in fact obtains.
69. When the actions of legal institutions do not generate new obligations but merely result in
additional reasons for pre-existing moral obligations, then, strictly speaking, I should talk of
the moral obligations that are reinforced in the appropriate way, rather than those that come
about in the appropriate way.
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actions are likely to have the effect on the moral profile of producing an
obligation to protect or rescue the minority group, to disobey the directives, to
try to change the policy, and so on. It is intuitively clear that an obligation that
comes about in this way is not a legal obligation, despite the fact that it is the
result of actions of legal institutions.
The example suggests a necessary condition on the legally proper way for
legal institutions to change the moral profile. If legal institutional action, by
making the moral situation worse, generates obligations to remedy, oppose, or
otherwise mitigate the consequences of the action, such obligations to mitigate
have not come about in the legally proper way. Call this general way of
changing the moral profile paradoxical (because the resulting obligations run in
the opposite direction from the standard case). Moral obligations that are
produced in the paradoxical way are not legal obligations.
It is important to note that legal institutional action that generates moral
obligations in the paradoxical way may also generate other moral obligations
that are legal obligations. For example, Proposition 13, the 1978 California
ballot initiative that restricted property taxes, made the moral situation worse
and may therefore have generated moral obligations to try to repeal it, but it
nevertheless generated legal obligations concerning the assessment of property
taxes. 7o
The necessary condition I have sketched matches our intuitive
understanding of the way in which legal systems are supposed to generate
obligations, and it is not ad hoc. As I mentioned above, on my view, a legal
system, by its nature, is supposed to change the moral situation for the better.
This understanding of what legal systems are supposed to do, or what they are
for, explains why moral obligations that are generated in the paradoxical way
are not legal obligations. The key idea is that, for an institution that, by its
nature, is supposed to improve the moral situation, a method that relies on
creating reasons to undo what the institution has wrought is a defective way of
generating obligations. 1 I have illustrated my suggestion that we can use our
70. Thanks to Seana Shiffrin for suggesting this example. Legal institutional action can also fail
to generate legal obligations. See infra Section IV.B.
71. Such a method could, in a particular case, ultimately improve the moral situation overall, for
example by producing a backlash against the legal system, or even a revolution. The
paradoxical method is not a reliable way of improving the moral situation in normal
circumstances, however. In general, accounts of what makes an object or system with a
point or function defective depend on a distinction between normal and abnormal
circumstances (for the relevant type of object or system). For example, under certain
circumstances, a heart with a leaky valve may be better at circulating blood than a heart
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understanding of what law and legal systems are supposed to do to explain
which ways of generating obligations are legally proper -and therefore which
obligations are legal. But I do not have a complete account of the legally proper
way; further work is needed.72
The Moral Impact Theory (version 3): The content of law is that part of
the moral profile created by the actions of legal institutions in the
legally proper way.
3. What Makes Something a Legal Institution
Because my formulation of the theory uses the term legal institution, I want
to conclude this Part by addressing briefly the question of what makes
something a legal institution.73 Although it is not the goal of the Moral Impact
without a leak. But a heart with a leaky valve is nevertheless defective because such a heart
will not generally be effective at circulating blood under the circumstances that are normal
for hearts.
72. There are other interesting ways in which legal institutions can generate moral obligations
that are intuitively not "legally proper." For example, suppose that a legislature explicitly
states that it is merely suggesting, not mandating, a proposed solution to a coordination
problem. Despite the precatory language, the legislative pronouncement could have the
effect of making the proposed solution more salient than others, thereby generating a moral
obligation to adopt that solution. It would seem peculiar to characterize this moral
obligation as a legal obligation. (Thanks to Ben Eidelson for raising this example.) On my
view, the reason that the resulting moral obligation does not count as a legal obligation
derives from another aspect of the nature of legal systems. In The Standard Picture and Its
Discontents, I argue that a legal system, by its nature, is supposed to generate all-things-
considered binding obligations. Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 84-96. I
call this the bindingness hypothesis. The hypothesis is not that generating binding obligations
is an aim of legal systems, but rather that it is a constraint on how a legal system is to go
about fulfilling other aims, such as changing the moral situation for the better. Id. at 88-89.
Because legal systems are supposed to change the moral situation for the better by
generating all-things-considered binding obligations, an institution that explicitly purports
not to be generating binding obligations is not acting in the legally proper way. Therefore,
the obligations that result, even if they happen to be all-things-considered binding, are not
legal obligations.
73. As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that the answer to this question is less critical for
my theory than it is for theories of law that presuppose the Standard Picture. On the Moral
Impact Theory, by contrast with such theories, there is no claim that legal institutions have
the special power to create legal obligations merely by issuing pronouncements according to
specified procedures. On the Moral Impact Theory, moreover, legal obligations are a subset
of genuine obligations, and whether we classify institutions as legal or not has no effect on
what we take our genuine obligations to be. Thus, the distinctions between legal and non-
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Theory to provide a theory of the nature of legal systems and institutions, I will
offer a necessary condition. An important part of what it is to be a legal
institution is to be part of a legal system, so an account of the nature of legal
institutions depends on an account of the nature of legal systems. On my view
of law, again, it is essential to legal systems that they are supposed to improve
the moral situation. Therefore, a necessary condition on a legal institution is
that it be an organization that, by its nature, is supposed to improve the moral
situation.74 (Again, the claim is not that legal institutions always improve our
moral situation, but that they are defective to the extent that they do not.) This
point explains, for example, the fact that an organization of powerful thugs
that controls a community is not a legal system or a legal institution. It is no
part of the organization's nature that it is supposed to improve the moral
situation. Scott Shapiro makes a similar argument in Legality.75
The foregoing is one necessary condition on legal systems and institutions;
there are certainly other necessary conditions. It is not my purpose here to
develop a complete account -the Moral Impact Theory is consistent with a
range of accounts, and others have done important work on this topic. For
example, Joseph Raz argues that legal systems are distinguished from other
institutionalized systems by their claiming authority to regulate any type of
legal obligations and between legal and non-legal institutions are less important than on
many other theories.
Having said this, it is an important question what makes an institution a legal
institution. For example, which institutions are legal, and therefore which obligations are
legal, will have implications for which obligations a legal system should enforce.
74. The claim in the text is too quick. That a legal system, by its nature, is supposed to improve the
moral situation doesn't entail that every legal institution is supposed to do that. Some legal
institutions might have minor supporting roles. But it is part of the Moral Impact Theory that the
legal institutions that are relevant for its purposes - the ones that generate those moral obligations
that are legal obligations-are ones that are supposed to improve the moral situation. As Ben
Eidelson pointed out to me, this point is really an elaboration of the notion of the legally proper
way of changing the moral profile, discussed above. That is, in order for a change in the moral
profile to come about in the legally proper way, it must be the result of action by a legal institution
that, by its nature, is supposed to improve the moral situation. The bindingness hypothesis, see
supra note 72, may also yield a necessary condition on a legal institution.
75. SHAPIRo, supra note 23, at 213-17. We disagree, however, about what makes it the case that
the law has a particular aim or is supposed to do something. On Shapiro's view, "[t]he law
possesses the aim that it does because high-ranking officials represent the practice as having
a moral aim or aims." Id. at 216-17. On my view, such representations are only one
determinant of what law is for or is supposed to do.
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behavior and by their claiming to be supreme76 Shapiro argues that Raz's
analysis fails to capture the relevant distinction; he offers, instead, the thesis
that a legal system must be self-certifying, i.e., 'free to enforce its own valid
rules without first having to establish their validity before some superior
official or tribunal (if one should exist)."7
Finally, at least in mature and stable legal systems, uncertainty about what
a legal institution is will not in practice lead to much uncertainty about what
the law is. For, in practice, there is a great deal of consensus about which
institutions are legal institutions. (In immature or unstable legal systems,
where there is uncertainty about what the legal institutions are, the Moral
Impact Theory predicts that there will be uncertainty about what the law is.)
It's also worth noting that, as Raz and Shapiro note, it is plausible that the
features that distinguish a legal system (or institution) from other systems are
a matter of degree. Unsurprisingly, there will be borderline cases.
III. THE MORAL IMPACT THEORY AND LEGAL INTERPRETATION
The outline of the theory is now complete. In this Part, I examine the
implications of the Moral Impact Theory for legal interpretation. 79 In Section
A, I return to the example drawn from Smith to illustrate in greater detail the
implications of the idea that legal interpretation involves working out the
moral consequence of the relevant facts. In Section B, I look at the way in
which the Moral Impact Theory explains the relevance to legal interpretation of
factors other than actions of legal institutions, such as canons of construction.
Finally, in Section C, I clarify and qualify the idea that legal interpretation may
require developing an ambitious moral theory.
A. A Statutory Interpretation Example
Recall that, in Smith, the defendant offered to trade a gun for cocaine.so He
76. RAZ, supra note 37, at 150-54. Raz's analysis has a third condition: a legal system must be an
open system. Id. at 152-54.
77. SHAPIRO, supra note 23, at 222.
78. See RAz, supra note 37, at 150; SHAPIRO, supra note 23, at 223-24.
79. On my usage of the term legal interpretation, see infra note 100.
so. 508 U.S. 223 (1993). The discussion in this Section focuses on statutes. For elaboration on
the way in which the Moral Impact Theory understands the impact of appellate decisions,
see supra Section II.B.
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was convicted of drug trafficking crimes and sentenced under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1), which provides for the imposition of augmented penalties if the
defendant "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime . . . uses . .. a firearm." The Supreme Court, over a vigorous dissent,
held that trading a gun satisfied the statutory requirement and therefore
affirmed Smith's conviction.
The Court's majority and dissenting opinions both regard the question as
whether the statutory language -"uses . . . a firearm" - has the effect of making
the specified penalty applicable to one who trades a firearm for drugs. The
opinions appeal to diverse considerations in support of their opposing
positions: the "ordinary meaning" of the word "use";8' dictionary definitions
of the word;" what people ordinarily mean by words or phrases in particular
contexts or how words ordinarily are used;3 how Congress intended the
language to be construed;4 how the statutory phrase is most reasonably read; 5s
whether Congress would have wished its language to cover the situation;16
whether Congress intended the type of transaction to receive augmented
punishment;7 the purpose of the statute;" how the word "used" is employed
in the United States Sentencing Guidelines;9 case law;90 other provisions in
Smith, 5o8 U.S. at 228, 230; id. at 242-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 229 (majority opinion).
Id. at 242, 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia seems to take his discussion of how
words ordinarily are used to be an explication of their ordinary meaning. As I discuss in the
text, however, his argument is better understood as getting at what people ordinarily mean
when they use certain words or phrases (roughly, speaker's meaning as opposed to semantic
content).
84. Id. at 229, 236.
85. Id. at 231.
86. Id. at 239.
Id. at 240. How is Congress's intention concerning which transactions are to receive
augmented punishment different from Congress's intention concerning how the language is
to be construed? The former is an intention concerning the ultimate legal impact of the
statute; the latter, by contrast, is a linguistic intention. For a nice example of how the two
can come apart, see the discussion of Saadeh v. Farouki, 107 F.3d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1997), in
Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?, supra note 2, at 242-44.
Smith, 508 U.S. at 24o.
Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 233 (majority opinion).
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the same statutory scheme;9' the history of the statute's modification over
time;92 and the rule of lenity.93
For all these claims about relevant considerations, the majority and
dissenting opinions strikingly lack both an account of why the relied-upon
considerations are relevant94 and an account of how much weight each
deserves -or, more generally, of how to adjudicate between the considerations
when they point in different directions. These two points are closely related:
without an understanding of why considerations are relevant in the first place,
it is difficult to know how to reconcile conflicts between them. 91
Recently, two philosophers of language, Stephen Neale and Scott Soames,
have (separately) pointed out that the Court's opinions in Smith are marred by
mistakes about language and communication.96 Most significantly, the Justices
seem unaware of the important distinction between the semantic content of a
sentence (roughly, what is conventionally encoded in the words) and what a
person means or intends to communicate on a particular occasion by uttering
the sentence (and might be easily understood by ordinary hearers to so
intend).97 I will use the term communicative content for this latter notion.
Soames and Neale share a central point: although the meaning of the word
"use" certainly includes trading, Congress, by employing the sentence in
question, may well have intended to communicate that the specified penalties
cover only the use of a gun as a weapon.9' Both assume without argument that
91. Id. at 233-35.
92. Id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
g. Id. at 246-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. In some instances, the opinions appeal to past practice. See id. at 228, 233-35, 239-40
(majority opinion); id. at 241-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On why past practice cannot
provide an adequate account, see infra note 102.
g. The majority and dissent do not even agree about which considerations are relevant. While
the dissent appeals to the Sentencing Guidelines, the majority finds it "dubious ... that the
Sentencing Guidelines are relevant in the present context." Id. at 231. But neither side offers
a reason for its position.
g6. SCOTT SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Special About the Law, in i
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYs 403 (2008); Stephen Neale, Textualism with Intent 69-72 (Nov.
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
97. See SOAMES, supra note 96, at 412-14; Neale, supra note 96, at 26-36. The distinction derives
from the seminal work of Paul Grice. PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989). I
am setting aside the further distinction between what is stated or asserted and what is
merely implicated, as it is unnecessary to the present discussion.
98. SOAMEs, supra note 96, at 414-15. The discussion of Smith in Neale's manuscript is
incomplete, but it is clear from the rest of the manuscript (and personal conversations) that
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the law is determined by the communicative content of the statute, not its
semantic content.99
Thus, despite all their sophistication about language, both philosophers are
ultimately in the same position as the Court. They point to a plausibly relevant
determinant of the content of the law- communicative content-that they
favor, but they offer no framework for explaining why it is relevant or why it
should trump other putative determinants.
As I now explain, the account of legal interpretation that derives from the
Moral Impact Theory supplies what is missing. 00 First, it offers an account of
the possible relevance of the diverse candidate factors mentioned by the Court's
opinions, as well as the one favored by the philosophers of language. Second,
this account of why factors are relevant yields an account of how potential
conflicts between sources are to be resolved.
On the Moral Impact Theory, a statute's contribution to the content of the
law is, roughly, the impact of the fact of the statute's enactment on the moral
profile. In interpreting a statute, therefore, a fact is relevant because it has a
bearing on the statute's impact on the moral profile. A fact might, for example,
this is Neale's central point. See Neale, supra note 96, at 70-72; see also id. at 26-27, 35-36, 49-
So & n.33, 60-62, 66-68.
99. See SOAMES, supra note 96. A caveat with respect to Neale. In a later version of his rich
paper, he writes that the communicative content of a statute (his preferred term is what a
statute states) "leaves wide open the question of the contribution it makes to the law," and
concedes that the latter question goes "well beyond the philosophy of language." Neale, The
Intentionalism of Textualism 5 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
Aside from this official disclaimer, however, Neale seems to assume throughout that the
communicative content of a statute is its contribution to the law. Moreover, if the disclaimer
were taken seriously, Neale's paper could not do what it purports to do. For example, his
paper claims, on exclusively linguistic grounds, to dissolve the debate between textualists
and intentionalists. But that debate concerns a statute's contribution to the content of the
law, not merely its communicative content. For criticism of the communicative content
theory of law held by Soames, Neale, and others, see Greenberg, Legislation as
Communication?, supra note 2.
100. As I use the term, legal interpretation is the activity of working out the content of the law.
Statutory interpretation, in particular, seeks to ascertain a statute's contribution to the content
of the law. My usage contrasts with one according to which interpretation is the activity
whose ultimate goal is to ascertain the linguistic content of the relevant legal texts. For this
latter usage, see Lawrence Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORD-AM
L. R-Ev. 453 (2013). Interpretation in my sense is also not to be equated with how courts
should decide cases. For example, in deciding cases, courts should sometimes create new
legal standards and should sometimes not enforce existing legal standards. See infra Section
III.C for brief discussion of the distinction between determining what the law is and
deciding cases.
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be relevant because it is a morally relevant aspect of the enactment of the
statute (or evidence of such a morally relevant aspect) or because it is a
background fact that affects the enactment's impact on the moral profile. In
other words, moral considerations explain why various factors are relevant.
Considerations of democracy and fairness provide explanations of why the
various factors mentioned by the Court in Smith are (or would plausibly be
thought to be) relevant. For example, the relevance of how Congress intended
the language to be construed, whether Congress would have wished its
language to cover the situation, how the statutory phrase is most reasonably
read, what Congress intended to communicate, and the purpose of the statute
are all plausibly explained by democratic considerations. What about
dictionary definitions and ordinary usage? Dictionary definitions and ordinary
usage are plausibly evidence of how the statutory phrase is most reasonably
read or what the legislature would have reasonably been understood to be
intending to communicate. And considerations of both democracy and fairness
arguably make those factors relevant. Similarly, fairness helps to explain the
basis of the rule of lenity and the relevance of decisions of past cases (because
of the importance of treating like cases alike).o
It is worth noting how natural it is to appeal to democracy, fairness, rule of
law, and other moral values to provide such explanations."o2 For example,
101. On the rule of lenity, see Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 76. On past
decisions, see supra text accompanying note 62.
102. Two other main candidates for what could explain the relevance of various factors to
statutory interpretation are linguistic considerations and established practice ("that's how
we do things in this legal system"). With respect to the former, I have argued elsewhere
that, though the study of language is helpful in clarifying and distinguishing the candidates
for a statute's contribution to the content of the law, it lacks the resources to explain which
of these candidates constitutes a statute's contribution to the law. See Greenberg, Legislation
as Communication?, supra note 2.
With respect to past practice, notice first that it may itself be relevant for moral
reasons. For example, if courts have in the past reliably interpreted statutes according to the
semantic content of the text rather than what the legislature intended to communicate, then
legislators and the public have reason to understand legislators to be voting on the semantic
content, not on the communicative content. So there are democratic reasons for interpreting
the statute in accordance with the past practice. Next, even if past practice can provide a
reason for interpreting a statute in a particular way, it can't be the only reason. For one
thing, it's familiar for judges and legal theorists to argue in favor of rejecting a particular
well-established practice. Justice Scalia, for example, has famously argued (on democratic
grounds) that legislative history deserves no weight in statutory interpretation. Such
arguments would be incoherent if past practice were the only relevant consideration. For
another thing, when past practice offers support for different ways of interpreting a statute,
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textualists often appeal to democratic values to support the view that the
intentions of legislators or framers, to the extent that they are not expressed in
the text, are not relevant to statutory or constitutional interpretation."o3 And,
similarly, intentionalists argue that democracy supports their view that what
matters is the legislators' intentions.10 4
The Moral Impact Theory offers not just an account of why various factors
are relevant, but, more importantly, an account of how conflicts between
relevant factors are to be resolved. On the Moral Impact Theory, the
contribution of a statute to the content of the law will depend on the on-
balance best resolution of conflicts between moral considerations. Morality
provides answers to questions of how conflicts between competing
considerations are to be resolved, for example, by determining how much
weight competing considerations deserve. In this respect, it differs from a
miscellaneous collection of considerations. If one asks what action is supported
by, say, considerations of health, efficiency, and aesthetics, then, assuming that
there is any conflict between the specified considerations, the question is
incomplete because one has not specified how the considerations are to be
weighed against each other. The Moral Impact Theory holds not merely that
we are to take into account moral considerations, but also that we are to give to
each consideration the relevance that morality in fact gives it. (I do not mean to
suggest that morality always provides a unique answer to every practical
question. There may be much indeterminacy.) Competing democratic
considerations may, for example, have different implications for which aspects
of the statute are relevant. Or considerations of democracy and considerations
of fairness might point in different directions in a particular case. According to
as it frequently does in our legal system, it provides no help in resolving the conflicts. In
Smith, for example, appeal to past practice does not resolve the issue. More fundamentally, I
have proposed elsewhere that it is an essential feature of a theoretically interesting class of
legal systems of which our legal system is a member- and perhaps of all legal systems -that
there are always reasons why a particular aspect of the practice has the consequences that it
does for the content of the law. The mere fact that things have been done a particular way in
the past cannot by itself provide such a reason. See Greenberg, How Facts Make Law, supra
note 2; Greenberg, How Facts Make Law II, supra note 2; Greenberg, On Practices and the
Law, supra note 2.
103. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCADA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
17-18 (1997); John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, io6 COLUM. L.
REv. 70 (2oo6).
104. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REvIEw (1999).
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the Moral Impact Theory, the correct resolution of such conflicts depends on
what the relevant moral values, on balance, support.
Again, we can illustrate with Smith. Here is a useful, if somewhat
simplified, way of understanding the fundamental disagreement between the
majority and the dissent. The majority believes, roughly speaking, that the
interpretation of the statutory provision is determined by its semantic content.
The dissent, though it does not understand the distinction between semantic
content and communicative content, is groping for the position that the
interpretation of the statute is determined by what Congress intended to
communicate or perhaps by what one who had uttered the words of the statute
would typically have intended.105 As noted above, these positions, by
themselves, offer no way forward. One side insists that the words of the
statute, as written, straightforwardly cover using a gun to trade, and the other
side argues that Congress probably used the words intending to communicate
that using a gun as a weapon subjects a defendant to the specified sentence.
According to the Moral Impact Theory, in order to adjudicate between
these positions, we need to develop the understandings of democracy (or other
moral considerations) that would support these different positions and then
determine which is the better understanding of democracy. One democratic
consideration might support the idea that what matters is not the actual
intentions of particular legislators, but only what is specifically encoded in the
language that is voted on by the legislature. A different aspect of democracy
might support giving decisive weight to the legislature's actual communicative
intentions. Because, according to the Moral Impact Theory, the correct
resolution of the conflict depends on the best understanding of all the relevant
considerations, resolving the conflict requires developing an account of
democracy. o6
1os. Soames suggests understanding the disagreement along essentially these lines. See SoMIEs,
supra note 96, at 412-15.
106. Accounts of statutory and constitutional interpretation that are grounded on moral
considerations often assume that there is one candidate for a provision's contribution to the
content of the law, whether it be original public meaning, communicative content, or
something else, that is supported by moral considerations with respect to all statutory or all
constitutional provisions. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 103-104. The Moral Impact
Theory makes no such assumption. It may be that the relevant values point in different
directions in the different circumstances of different statutory or constitutional provisions.
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B. The Relevance to Statutory Interpretation ofFactors Other than Actions of
Legal Institutions
I have mostly emphasized the way in which the Moral Impact Theory
explains the relevance of actions of legal institutions. It is also worth noting
that the Moral Impact Theory offers an approach to explaining the relevance of
other factors to the content of the law. Various facts and circumstances can be
relevant to the content of the law because they affect the way in which actions
of legal institutions alter the moral profile. Customs, settled expectations or
practices in a particular industry, actions of important non-legal actors,
influential misunderstandings of statutes, and new technological developments
can have moral implications and therefore can affect what is morally required
as a result of a particular statute (or other legal institutional action). Customs,
expectations, and the like may affect what fairness requires, which solution to a
problem is most likely to be adopted by others, or how the public understands
the problem a statute addresses. This kind of account can be used to analyze
the relevance of diverse factors to the law. To take one example, on such an
account, the relevance of foreign law to constitutional law would be
determined by asking what bearing foreign law has on the Constitution's
impact on the moral profile. Obviously, this schematic suggestion does not
solve the problem, but it offers a framework for thinking about it.
The Supreme Court's famous decision in Holy Trinity Church v. United
States'07 might be well understood as involving the relevance of background
factors to the moral impact of legislation. A church contracted with a man who
was not a U.S. citizen to bring him to the United States to serve as rector. The
statute at issue stated that it was unlawful to make a contract to bring a
foreigner to the United States "to perform labor or service of any kind in the
United States." Although the Court conceded that the contract fell "within the
letter" of the statutory provision,os it decided that the contract was not in fact
prohibited.
The Court put great weight on the ground that "no purpose of action
against religion can be imputed to any legislation, state or national, because
this is a religious people.""o" The Court characterized this factor as evidence of
Congress's intentions.1 o On the Moral Impact Theory, Congress's intentions
107. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
1o8. Id. at 458.
iog. Id. at 465.
1io. Id. at 465-72.
1332
123:12 88 2014
THE MORAL IMPACT THEORY OF LAW
might be relevant for democratic reasons. But in fact the religious values to
which the Court appeals would be poor evidence of Congress's actual
intentions, and, moreover, there are important democratic reasons why
congressional intentions that are not made publicly available should not affect
our obligations.
The Moral Impact Theory could explain, instead, that the Court took the
importance of religious values to affect the impact of the statute on the moral
profile. Roughly, the idea would be that the Court took there to be important
moral reasons why religious organizations should not be restricted in the
activity, central to their mission, of hiring clergy. These reasons prevented the
statute from affecting the moral profile in the way that it otherwise would
have. This understanding is of course consistent with the fact that a different,
more specific statute could override those reasons.
A less dated example might make the point more clearly. Consider the
canons of statutory construction that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of
Native Americans and veterans.'" According to the Moral Impact Theory, these
canons are ways of taking into account the United States's moral debts to
Native Americans and veterans, respectively.H2 Any statute acts against the
background of moral reasons flowing from those debts. Those reasons may be
sufficient to nudge the impact of a statute on the moral profile.
(Understanding the canons in question as taking into account pre-existing
moral reasons might seem obvious. But most theories of law -notably, theories
that presuppose the Standard Picture -either have difficulty explaining how
pre-existing moral reasons could have such relevance to the content of the law
or have to regard the canons as instructing courts how to make law, rather than
how to work out a statute's contribution to the content of the law.)
Other canons and interpretive doctrines can be understood in similar ways.
The rule of lenity and the doctrine of avoiding absurd results are obvious
examples. The Moral Impact Theory also understands linguistic or textual
canons as rules of thumb for working out the moral consequences of statutes.
For example, considerations of democracy and fairness militate in favor of a
ill. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985) ("[S]tatutes are to be
construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their
benefit."); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1206 (2011) ("We have
long applied 'the canon that provisions for benefits to members of the Armed Services are to
be construed in the beneficiaries' favor."' (quoting King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215,
220-21 n.9 (1991))).
m12. Thanks to Ben Eidelson for suggesting the example of the canon concerning Native
Americans.
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statute's contribution being publicly accessible. Many of the linguistic canons
can be understood as implementing these moral considerations by tending to
push a statute's contribution toward the way in which people would ordinarily
understand the statute. Examples include: expresio unius est exclusio alterius;
ejusdem generis; and noscitur a sociis.
I should add that I do not mean to endorse the Court's decision in Holy
Trinity or particular canons of construction. My point is just to explicate the
resources of the Moral Impact Theory for understanding the relevance of
diverse factors to the content of the law.
C. Clarification of the Need for an Ambitious Moral Theory
I want to close this Part by clarifying and qualifying the idea that legal
interpretation may require working out an account of what the relevant moral
values, on balance, support. First, obviously, the Moral Impact Theory does
not convert statutory interpretation into an algorithm-a mechanical
procedure."' Working out the best account of the relevant moral
considerations can be a complex task requiring difficult judgments. What the
Moral Impact Theory does provide is an understanding of what makes it the
case that the statute is to be interpreted in a particular way, given that different
factors point in different directions. Specifically, the correct interpretation is
correct because it specifies the impact of the statute on the moral profile. Thus,
the Moral Impact Theory clarifies what the questions are, so that we are not
reduced to listing factors that point in different directions. According to the
Moral Impact Theory, the master question is what is morally required in light
of the enactment of the statute, not what the statute's linguistic content is.
With respect to any specific factor that might be thought relevant, the question
is what relevance moral considerations give to that factor, as opposed to other
factors.
Second, if it is conceded that, say, a particular democratic consideration can
help to explain whether a particular aspect of a statute is relevant, there is a
powerful argument that what ultimately matters is what all the relevant values,
on balance, require. To begin with, it is very difficult to see how it could be
113. The fact that the theory does not convert statutory interpretation into a mechanical
procedure is no objection to it. Indeed, it would raise serious doubts about the Moral Impact
Theory if it purported to offer an algorithm for statutory interpretation. Below, I consider
the objection that, because the Moral Impact Theory has the consequence that working out
the content of the law requires moral reasoning, it makes it impossible for law to fulfill its
settlement function. See infra Section IV.B.
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that a democratic consideration is relevant to a statutory interpretation
question, but that in order to resolve that question, we don't need an account
of what democratic values, on the best understanding, require. If it matters
that a particular aspect of democracy favors one interpretation of a statute, how
could it not matter that, on balance, democratic values favor a different
interpretation? Similarly, if democratic values support a particular approach to
interpreting statutes, how could it not be relevant that once we take into
account fairness as well as democracy, a different approach is favored? In short,
if moral considerations are relevant, then, to the extent that they conflict, it is
difficult to see what could justify a stopping place short of what moral values,
on balance, support.'14 This argument suggests that, if one denies the need for
an account of what morality requires with respect to statutory interpretation,
one must deny that, for instance, democratic considerations have any bearing
on the proper approach to statutory interpretation.
Third, although the previous point suggests that an ambitious moral
account might sometimes be needed because the relevant moral considerations
conflict, I don't mean to suggest that whenever we have to work out what the
law is, we have to work out a complete account of all the relevant moral
considerations. In the run of cases, all of the plausible accounts of democracy,
fairness, and so on favor the same outcome. Therefore, in order to resolve such
cases, it is not necessary to turn to the underlying moral considerations. That is
why most cases are easy cases. Even in difficult cases, it is only necessary to
eliminate candidate accounts to the extent that they favor a different outcome
in the case at hand.
Fourth, judges and other agents faced with an actual legal case operate
under a range of practical and ethical constraints apart from what the content
of the law dictates. For example, as in many areas of cognitive endeavor,
because of shortages of time, memory, and so on, a second-best solution might
114. It is familiar to encounter arguments that, in a particular context, only certain moral
considerations should be considered. But this type of argument rests on the claim that, in
the context in question, it is morally better, on balance, not to take certain moral
considerations into account. What is needed to block the argument in the text is, rather, an
argument for not taking into account certain considerations, regardless of whether, on
balance, it is better that they be taken into account. A different possible way to block the
argument would be to find a proprietary legal justification for not taking into account moral
considerations. It is conceivable that the nature of law itself might determine how statutory
interpretation is to be carried out. In that case, however, no appeal to democracy or the like
would be relevant. To block the argument, we would need a proprietary legal reason why,
say, one aspect of democracy is relevant to statutory interpretation but other aspects of
democracy are not.
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yield better results. That is, judges with limited time and capacities might well
do better to follow relatively simple heuristics, rather than trying to work out
explicitly the impact on the moral profile of all of the relevant actions. I want to
set aside the important topic of how, all things considered, judges should
decide cases. (Because of the kinds of constraints just mentioned, I take it that
the content of the law is a very important, though by no means the only,
determinant of how judges should decide cases.) The Moral Impact Theory is,
rather, a theory of what determines the content of the law. I am using the
examples of Smith and Holy Trinity Church to explicate the theory's
implications for statutory interpretation, i.e., working out a statute's
contribution to the content of the law, rather than its more indirect
implications for how judges should ultimately decide cases.
Fifth, it is a mistake to assume that one must produce a rigorous theoretical
solution to a problem in order reliably to generate accurate answers. For
example, what to believe-how to form and update one's beliefs about the
world-is widely believed to be a massively holistic problem. When deciding
what to believe on a particular issue, there is in general no way in advance to
rule out the possible relevance of anything that you know. But you would be
stopped in your tracks if, on every issue that arises, you had to take into
account everything that you already know before deciding what to believe.
How to hive off a manageable set of relevant considerations is a deep problem
in philosophy of mind and cognitive science." 5 Yet, in practice, humans are
remarkably good at forming and updating their beliefs about the world quickly
and reliably, without considering everything they know. The point is that
people can be skilled in practice at producing answers to a problem, despite the
fact that producing a full, rigorous derivation of the answers would be
unmanageably difficult. (Moreover, we can be skilled at producing answers
without knowing how we do it.) It is therefore a mistake to assume that,
because the Moral Impact Theory holds that the content of the law depends on
what the moral considerations, on balance, support, the Moral Impact Theory
makes impossibly difficult the everyday task of working out what the law is.
The skills of reading statutes and cases that lawyers learn in law school may be
generally reliable ways of working out the impact of statutes and judicial
decisions on the moral profile, typically without the need to consider moral
considerations explicitly.
115. see JERRY FODOR, THE MIND DOESN'T WORK THAT WAY: THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF
COMPUTATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 23-40 (2000).
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Finally, I do not mean to claim that there will always be a single best
resolution of every conflict between relevant factors. The Moral Impact Theory
has the consequence that, if there are competing candidates for a statute's
contribution and the relevant considerations do not favor one candidate over
the others, then the law is indeterminate between the competing candidates.
IV. OBJECTIONS
In this Part, I address two possible objections, one concerning the
possibility of morally arbitrary and morally bad legal norms and one
concerning the law's ability to settle disagreement.
A. Arbitrary and Evil Legal Norms
First, it might be thought that because my view holds that legal obligations
are certain moral obligations, it cannot account for morally arbitrary and
morally bad legal rules.
The worry about morally arbitrary legal rules is easy to address. The key
point is that we need to distinguish between what morality requires ex ante -
before the legal institutions act-and what it requires ex post-after the
relevant actions of the legal institutions. Of course, it is not morally required ex
ante to file one's tax return by April 15 as opposed to April 1 or any other day.
But it may well be morally required to do so once a particular scheme with its
particular arbitrary choices has been implemented, others are participating in
it, and so forth.
With respect to morally bad legal norms, the same kinds of considerations
are part of the answer. As emphasized above, as a result of legal institutional
action, it can become morally obligatory to participate in a scheme that is
seriously morally flawed or to follow a morally flawed rule. Although these
sorts of considerations can explain much morally flawed law, they cannot
explain truly evil legal norms. Because my theory holds that the law is a certain
part of the moral profile, my theory has the consequence that the law can never
include truly evil norms. Such norms can never be part of the moral profile.
Some readers will think that this consequence of my theory is a mark in the
theory's favor. But others will think that this consequence is a mark against the
theory because they think it is obvious that there are truly evil legal norms.
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For those in this latter camp, I want to make two points. First, recall the
distinction between the two senses of "a law."" 6 I emphasize that my theory
does not deny that there are evil laws, where "laws" is used in the sense of
statutes or other authoritative legal texts. It should be uncontroversial that there
are bad statutes, ordinances, regulations, and so on. The issue is the much
more theoretical one of what impact on the content of the law such statutes
have -in particular, whether such statutes give rise to evil legal norms. So the
Moral Impact Theory accepts that there is a clear sense in which there are
evil laws.117
Second, I want to make a fairly banal methodological point. Ultimately, the
way to determine whether there can be truly evil legal norms is not to consult
English usage or even lawyers' intuitions. True theories often have
counterintuitive consequences - a great deal of what we now think about the
world and about human beings would once have been thought to be absurd.
We have to evaluate how successful theories are on a wide range of criteria, and
once we have decided in this holistic way which theory is most successful, we
then have to accept whatever counterintuitive consequences that theory has (at
least until a better theory comes along)."'
B. Moral Disagreement
Another possible objection is that the role that the Moral Impact Theory
gives to moral reasoning is incompatible with a fundamental function of law -
that of settling disagreements and eliminating uncertainty. Human beings
disagree frequently about practical matters, about what is to be done. Law is
supposed to provide a mechanism for settling these disagreements." 9 If the
Standard Picture were correct, the objection goes, then we would be able to see
how law could serve this settlement function. But, the objection continues,
working out the moral profile will typically be highly controversial. Therefore,
116. See supra Subsection II.A.3.
117. Thanks to Derek Parfit for helpful discussion on this point.
118. It is also worth noting that the content of the law in the United States may appear to fall
further short of ideal justice than it actually does because of the judicial unenforcement of
constitutional norms. See SAGER, supra note 57; Sager, supra note 28. For example, because
of institutional concerns, courts do not invalidate some statutes that are in fact
constitutionally invalid.
119. See LIARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, AND THE
DiLEMMA OF LAW (2001).
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if figuring out what the law is involved working out the moral profile, then law
would not serve its settlement function.
First, it is controversial what the functions of law are, or even whether law
has functions, but let us grant for purposes of argument that settling
disagreements is an important function of law. It is at least as plausible,
however, that law also has other important functions, such as those of ensuring
that government coercion is used only in accordance with past political
decisions, 2 o acting for the public good, and improving our moral situation.12 1
Thus, in order to evaluate how well the law would do at fulfilling its plausible
functions (if a particular theory of law were true), we need to consider more
than just the settlement function. For example, very roughly, if the Moral
Impact Theory, as opposed to the Standard Picture, is true, then the law will
do better at generating norms that are supported by moral considerations and
less well at yielding certainty. I have argued elsewhere that, in other respects,
the Moral Impact Theory suggests that the law is defective less often than the
Standard Picture suggests. For example, if the Moral Impact Theory is true,
then we will not find that the law regularly requires people to do morally
impermissible things, such as to punish people who do not deserve it. 2 2
At any rate, how well law would perform various of its functions if a
particular theory of law were true has only a highly indirect bearing on whether
that theory of law is true. The law is surely less than perfect at fulfilling some of
its functions. In particular, we know that statutes and appellate decisions often
fail to end controversy and even spawn further litigation. That a theory of law
predicts that the law would be highly effective at performing the settlement
function does not tell us much about whether the theory is true. On the other
hand, it would certainly be telling if a theory of law predicted that law would
generally be unable to perform one of its functions.
Second, however, it is not true that, on the Moral Impact Theory, the law
would not be able to serve the function of resolving moral disagreement. To
begin with, a very important part of the way in which a legal system settles
disagreement is by having a mechanism for generating specific orders (directed
120. See DwoRKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 28, at 93.
121. Seana Shiffrin has argued that law has a function of morally educating citizens and
developing their moral capacities. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation:
On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARv. L. REV. 1214 (2010). If law has such a function,
then the need to engage in moral reasoning to work out the content of the law actually
enables the law to better fulfill one of its functions.
122. See Greenberg, The Standard Picture, supra note 2, at 96-104.
1339
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
at particular individuals) that are backed up with force. We know from our
own legal system that the content of the law is often highly controversial. As
just noted, the enactment of a statute does not simply end disagreement.
Specific orders directed at individuals are required in order to end
disagreement in a peaceful way. As argued above, there are powerful moral
reasons to give binding force to such specific orders of a government that has
de facto authority. The Moral Impact Theory thus encounters no difficulty
accounting for this central way of settling disagreement.
Moreover, it is false that the dependence of law on morality entails that the
law cannot help to resolve disagreement and increase certainty about what is to
be done. The enactment of a statute or other actions by legal institutions often
change the circumstances in ways that make it much easier to determine what
is obligatory.
There is a spectrum of different kinds of cases. At one end of the spectrum,
there are highly controversial issues such as the permissibility of abortion or
whether we should have a flat tax or a progressive tax. Even after the legal
system takes action, for example by the legislature's enacting legislation,
controversy is likely to continue. Even in such cases, however, the legislature's
action may well change the circumstances in a way that makes it less
controversial what is required ex post. Many who think that a flat tax would be
more just than a progressive tax ex ante will recognize that once the legislature
has acted, participation in the progressive tax scheme may become morally
obligatory. Moreover, as noted above, the fact that action by the legal system
often does not end controversy is exactly what we find in our legal system, so
the fact that the Moral Impact Theory predicts such continuing controversy is
actually a mark in its favor. Again, the way in which the legal system ends
controversy when necessary is not to make more law but to direct a
particularized order at a specific person.
It is important to recognize, however, that most issues are not like this. At
the opposite end of the spectrum from issues on which controversy is unlikely
to be settled even after extensive legislation and litigation, there are issues on
which action by legal institutions can easily make the relevant part of the moral
profile uncontroversial. Before the legislature enacts a statute specifying that
cars must drive on the right side of the road, it is difficult to determine which
side one should drive on, and there may well be no right answer. Once the
legislature makes the right side salient and provides all kinds of mechanisms
for enforcement, it is obvious that one should drive on that side.
Between the two ends of the spectrum are cases in which legal institutions
can take action that clarifies what is morally required, even if it does not render
it utterly uncontroversial. As the examples in Part II illustrated, legal
institutions have a range of tools for making it more determinate and certain
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what morality requires.' Consequently, it is often easier to work out how the
legal institutions have affected the moral profile than to work out the ex ante
content of morality. Moreover, ordinary citizens can consult experts-also
known as lawyers - in working out the impact of the legal institutions on the
moral profile. As suggested above, legal interpretation skills, such as those of
reading statutes and cases, may be reliable methods of working out the impact
of actions of legal institutions on the moral profile - typically without the need
to consider moral considerations explicitly. In sum, the Moral Impact Theory is
consistent with law's having the ability to help settle disagreement about what
is to be done.
CONCLUSION
According to the Moral Impact Theory, the content of the law is that part
of the moral profile that obtains in virtue of certain actions of legal institutions.
In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing how simple and natural the theory is.
On the face of it, law-creating institutions try to create binding obligations.
The Moral Impact Theory takes this datum seriously, maintaining that legal
obligations are the genuine obligations that the legal institutions succeed in
creating. As noted in the Introduction, the Moral Impact Theory also makes it
easier to understand our abiding concern with law than do the two dominant
views of law, the Standard Picture and the Dworkinian view.
I hope that I have also given a feel for the point of legal institutions'
changing the moral profile, thereby creating legal norms. By changing the
relevant circumstances, legal institutions can improve the moral situation in a
variety of ways-for example by simplifying, clarifying, and making
determinate our obligations. Consider again the example of the tax scheme.
There is a pre-existing problem, and, consequently, important moral reasons to
help to solve it. But those pre-existing moral reasons do not determinately and
clearly support one particular solution. The legal system is able to channel the
pre-existing moral reasons toward a particular solution. The legal system's
action of publishing a particular scheme, setting up implementing
mechanisms, and making others' participation likely changes the morally
relevant circumstances.
My theory contrasts sharply with the Standard Picture, on which legal
institutions make pronouncements, thereby automatically generating legal
123. See supra text accompanying notes 51-62.
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norms that correspond to the contents of the pronouncements. On the Moral
Impact Theory, the legislative enactment of a statute may often have roughly
the net effect of adding to the content of the law a norm that is more or less
captured by the linguistic content of the legislation. But, when it does so, the
explanation will be that the enactment of the statute changed the relevant
circumstances, thus changing what people are morally required or permitted to
do-not that the legal norm obtains simply because it was authoritatively
pronounced.
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